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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the leading causes of Naval 
Aviation mishaps, and develop a methodology for the generation and evaluation 
of mishap intervention strategies. To this end, three analytical efforts were 
conducted. The first effort was an analysis of Naval Aviation mishaps to 
determine the most frequently occurring type of human error. The second effort 
analyzed the results of a survey of Naval aircrews intended to determine the 
human errors perceived to be likely causes of future mishaps. The third effort 
explored and revised a methodology for developing mishap intervention 
strategies in current and future aircraft systems. 
The first analytical effort of this thesis examined Naval Aviation mishap 
data from FY2000-FY2008. These mishap investigation reports were recently 
recoded into the Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (DoD-HFACS) taxonomy by a Naval Safety Center analyst. 
This taxonomy is a standard methodology to classify, catalog, and analyze the 
contribution of human error to mishaps. For the data available, the most 
commonly occurring DoD-HFACS categories were determined for the following 
communities: Navy and Marine Corps combined (F/A-18, AV-8B, H-60, H-53, H-
46, UH-1, & AH-1W), overall Navy (F/A-18 & H-60), overall Marine Corps (F/A-
18, AV-8B, H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-1W), Navy F/A-18, Marine Corps F/A-18, 
Navy Helicopter (H-60), and Marine Corps Helicopter (H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-
1W). The top two categories across all communities were skill-based errors and 
coordination/communication/planning factors. In general, these two categories 
occurred at a much higher rate than other categories, doubling the occurrence 
rate of the third place category in many cases. Judgment and decision-making 
errors appeared in the top five lists of all but Marine Corps helicopters, where it 
placed seventh. Comparing these results to other aviation mishaps studies that 
have used HFACS, revealed a degree of commonality in the type of human 
errors involved in all aviation mishaps (both commercial and military). 
 xviii
The second analytical effort examined the results of a strategic human 
factors review conducted by the Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) in the 
spring of 2008. As part of this review, each individual squadron was directed to 
identify their top five human factors concerns. This data was collected using the 
nanocodes of the DoD-HFACS classification system. Squadrons were instructed 
that they could analyze current issues or try to predict the cause of the next 
mishap. Results from each squadron were compiled at the appropriate type wing 
(a collection of several squadrons operating similar aircraft platforms) and 
relayed to CNAF. To allow comparison with the results from the first analytical 
effort, only F/A-18 and H-60 aircraft data was analyzed. Five out of six type wings 
for F/A-18 and H-60 squadrons identified ops tempo/workload, proficiency, 
complacency, and motivational exhaustion (burnout) as being among their top 
five concerns. These nanocodes belong to the DoD-HFACS levels of 
organization, supervision, and preconditions, which sharply contrasted the act-
level errors identified in the mishap data from the first analytical effort. While this 
difference could be influenced by biases inherent in the points of view of mishap 
investigators and aircrews, it also demonstrates that mishap investigations do not 
tell the complete story in regards to the causes of mishaps. In order for safety 
professionals to fully understand all the influential factors causing mishaps, both 
perspectives must be considered. 
The third analytical effort examined a mishap intervention and evaluation 
methodology, called the Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX), proposed by 
Shappell and Wiegmann (2006, 2009, in press). A number of recommendations 
were suggested based upon the unique needs of the Navy to make the 
framework more useful for program managers involved in the development of 
new aircraft. HFIX uses five domains of possible intervention sources 
(organizational/administrative, human/crew, technology/engineering, task/ 
mission, and operational/physical environment) and uses them to guide 
brainstorming sessions conducted by a group of aviation professionals from 
varied backgrounds. Once ideas are generated, they are compared and 
 xix
evaluated based of the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, cost, effectiveness, and 
sustainability. The HFIX domains of possible intervention sources were found 
lacking and two other sources of intervention strategies were considered: human 
systems integration (HSI) and doctrine, organization, training, material, 
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Analyzing the merits of each, 
an alternative list of mishap intervention domains that draws upon the 
advantages of each was presented. These domains were: mission, manpower, 
personnel, training, human factors engineering, policy/procedures, leadership, 
and facilities/environment. Additionally, the original form of HFIX only addresses 
mishap causes at the acts level of HFACS. Although mishap investigations tend 
to cite causal errors at this level, the second analytical effort suggests that higher 
levels such as preconditions, supervision, and organization should also be 
considered. In the revised version of HFIX, all twenty categories of DoD-HFACS 
were open to scrutiny.  
The cost of mishaps to the Department of Defense in terms of personnel, 
equipment, and financial resources continues to be a driving factor in the pursuit 
of reducing aviation mishap rates. Although technological and engineering 
improvements have drastically reduced the frequency of mishaps over the last 30 
years, the remaining constant is human error. It is unlikely human error will ever 
be eliminated as a mishap casual factor. However, the effective application of the 
eight mishap intervention domains (mission, manpower, personnel, training, 
human factors engineering, policy/procedures, leadership, and facilities/ 
environment) may be able to reduce its influence. The multidisciplinary approach 
of HSI is useful in comparing the relative merit of various intervention strategies 
and performing tradeoffs in order to arrive at an acceptable solution. The revised 
HFIX methodology draws upon this approach to provide a comprehensive 
approach to mishap intervention. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
On May 19, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a 
memorandum to the secretaries of the armed services challenging them to 
reduce the number of mishaps and accident rates by at least half within the next 
two years. Stating that “world class organizations do not tolerate preventable 
accidents” (Secretary of Defense, 2003, p. 1), Rumsfeld’s directive was aimed at 
reinvigorating the services’ safety efforts and breaking the stagnation in mishap 
reduction in recent years. Six years later, the Department of Defense (DoD) has 
yet to reach its goal, but vigorously continues to pursue it. Besides responsible 
leadership, simple economics is a large motivator. The cost of preventable 
accidents to the services consists of both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs 
include medical treatment, disability payments, and repair or replacement of 
damaged equipment. Indirect costs are often more difficult to measure, including 
schedule delays, training replacement personnel, and additional sorties to 
accomplish the intended mission. With direct costs from mishaps totaling 
approximately $3 billion annually and indirect costs estimated at approaching 
four times that amount (Secretary of Defense, 2007), accident reduction efforts 
potentially represent substantial monetary savings to the U.S. military. In addition 
to economic costs, mishaps severely affect readiness. The reduction or 
elimination of preventable accidents would provide a considerable boost to 
readiness and overall mission effectiveness. 
The occurrence of an aircraft mishap usually prompts an investigation to 
determine the causes. Once causation has been determined, the natural course 
of action is to develop and implement interventions to prevent a similar mishap 
from occurring in the future. Traditionally, intervention efforts are focused on the 
immediate future (e.g., new procedures, additional training, and aircraft 
modification). There is, however, a broader perspective with which to approach 
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mishap intervention strategies. The mishaps of today can also provide 
meaningful information towards the prevention of mishaps in the more distant 
future. Applying the lessons learned from yesterday’s mishaps to the design 
process of tomorrow’s aircraft may well prevent future mishaps by avoiding the 
very conditions and circumstances that make them likely in the first place. For 
example, a common mishap in retractable landing gear aircraft is to land with the 
landing gear up simply due to the failure of a distracted pilot to lower them. An 
aircraft design change that resulted from these mishaps is the gear warning horn, 
designed to sound when the aircraft is close to the ground and at approach 
airspeed. In short, to be most effective, safety and mishap prevention should be 
considered from the outset of system design and not merely once a tragedy has 
befallen a fielded system. 
To break out of what Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) call the “blame and 
train” paradigm of mishap investigation and intervention, a clear and effective 
methodology is needed to: a) determine and classify all the relevant causes of 
mishaps; b) identify the causes most in need of attention; and c) develop 
effective intervention strategies. Various tools for mishap investigation and 
classification exist (e.g., Heinrich, Peterson, & Roos, 1980; Reason, 1990; 
O’Hare, Wiggins, Batt, & Morrison, 1994, Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Indeed, 
organizations such as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and the Naval Safety Center have spent countless man-
hours investigating and cataloging the causes of aircraft mishaps. The challenge 
for safety professionals is to use this data to prevent future accidents. To this 
end, it is the goal of this thesis to develop a methodology for generating mishap 
intervention strategies that can be incorporated into the design of future aircraft 
and aircraft systems. 
 3
B. BACKGROUND 
Naval Aviation mishaps have been the subject of several studies over the 
last 50 years (e.g., Borowsky & Wall, 1983; Yacavone, 1993; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 1996). The rapid advancement of aviation technology, spurred by 
several armed conflicts, has demanded that the evolution of management and 
safety programs keep pace. The fact that Naval Aviation has been more focused 
on safety than other communities is not surprising. From its very beginning, 
Naval Aviation has always been an inherently risky enterprise with dire 
consequences for error. The considerable costs in personnel and equipment 
provide sizeable incentives to reduce the frequency of mishaps. To illustrate, the 
2009 unit cost of an F/A-18E/F is $54.7 million (Department of the Navy, 2009) 
and a 1999 General Accounting Office report listed the basic cost of training a 
military pilot at over $1 million (with a cost in excess of $9 million for the pilot to 
gain full operational experience).  
In the early years of Naval Aviation, the mishap rate for class A mishaps, 
the most serious accident category, enjoyed a dramatically decreasing trend. 
However, in the last 20 years that decreasing trend has reached a relative 
plateau (see Figure 1). Naval Aviation owes its significant reduction in mishap 
rates to both technical and non-technical interventions, including the adoption of 
angled carrier decks, the establishment of the Naval Safety Center, the 
implementation of the Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures 
Standardization (NATOPS) program, and others listed in Figure 1. Although the 
decline in mishap rates seems encouraging, it is important to note that the trend 
has leveled off. Although some may argue that the current mishap rates may 
represent the “cost of doing business,” it may instead indicate the last true 
remaining cause of mishaps—human error. 
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Figure 1.   Naval Aviation Safety Historical Perspective (After: Langford, 2009) 
The early days of aviation provided ample room for improvement in 
virtually every aspect of flight safety, from aircraft design, materials, and 
construction to pilot selection, training, and technique. Over the years, substantial 
gains have been made in the technical aspects of aviation. Aircraft engines are 
built to precise standards and operate for thousands of hours without issue. 
Redundant systems, inherent in today’s modern aircraft, provide layers of 
protection against mechanical component failures. The human element of flight 
has improved as well, with more rigorous safety procedures, the widespread use 
of high-fidelity simulator training, and human error avoidance practices, such as 
crew resource management. However, the reduction of human error in aviation 
lags behind the decline of mechanical failure.  
Shappell and Wiegmann (1996) evaluated 6,700 Naval Aviation mishaps 
between 1977 and 1992 to determine the proportion of mishaps attributed to 
human error. Figure 2 illustrates that human and mechanical factors played 
nearly an equal role in Naval Aviation mishaps in 1977. Although mechanical 
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causes were all but eliminated by 1992, human error had only been reduced by 
approximately 50%. In more recent data collected by the Naval Safety Center 
between 2003 and 2007, human error was still found to be responsible, at least 
in part, for over 90% of Navy and Marine Corps class A flight mishaps (Langford, 
2009). Clearly, if further reductions in the mishap rate are to be achieved, 
eliminating human error must be the focus of safety efforts. 
 
Figure 2.   Rate Of Naval Aviation Mishaps Associated With Human Error 
Versus Those Solely Attributable To Mechanical Or Environmental 
Factors. (From: Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p.11)  
Recognizing the considerable role human error plays in today’s accidents, 
Shappell and Wiegmann (1997, 2000, 2001) developed a framework for 
classifying human factors in mishaps. Their work became the basis for the DoD’s 
Human Factors and Analysis Classification System (DoD-HFACS), which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter II. This taxonomy is the method mandated by 
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the DoD to dissect human error in a systematic way in order to aid mishap 
investigation, facilitate data collection and storage, and provide quantifiable 
evidence for the development of mishap prevention strategies. Although DoD-
HFACS is useful in its own right for developing interventions, this thesis will draw 
upon the domains of Human Systems Integration (HSI) as the foundation for 
incorporating mishap prevention characteristics into the next generation of 
aircraft. 
C. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Human Systems Integration is an interdisciplinary approach to ensuring 
the human is thoroughly considered in the design, development, and integration 
of a new system. The DoD instruction on the operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System (DoDI 5000.02) requires a system’s program manager to 
have an HSI plan in order to “…optimize total system performance, minimize total 
ownership costs, and ensure that the system is built to accommodate the 
characteristics of the user population that will operate, maintain, and support the 
system” (Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
2008, p.60).  Additionally, DoDI 5000.02 identifies the domains of HSI that must 
be addressed in the acquisitions process. These HSI domains are: 
• Manpower: The number and type of military, DoD civilians, and 
contractors needed to operate, support, and maintain a system. 
• Personnel: The human performance characteristics required of a 
system’s user population to include their knowledge, skills, and 
abilities.  
• Training: The means to enhance and maintain the knowledge, 
skills, abilities of a system’s operators, maintainers, and support 
personnel to ensure optimal performance. 
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• Human Factors Engineering: The optimization of human-machine 
interface in the design and engineering of a system, accounting for 
the physical, sensory, and cognitive characteristics of the user 
population. 
• Survivability: The capability of a system to evade detection by 
threats, provide protection, egress and escape for the crew, and 
avoid fratricide of friendly forces. 
• Habitability: The physical environment of the system affecting the 
morale and quality of life of the user population during sustained 
operations. 
• Safety and Occupational Health: The inherent ability of the system 
to prevent acute and chronic injury, illness, disability, or death to its 
operators, maintainers, and support personnel. 
This thesis is relevant to five domains of HSI: manpower, personnel, 
training, human factors engineering, and safety. Manpower, personnel, training, 
and human factors engineering are the primary domains that can be manipulated 
during the system acquisitions process in order to produce desired levels of 
personnel survivability, habitability, safety, and occupational health (Tvaryanas, 
Brown, & Miller, 2009). Specifically, this thesis will demonstrate a method to 
generate mishap intervention strategies within these four domains and use an 
HSI approach to conducting tradeoffs between them.  
Intervention strategies may be planned for both the short term, using 
existing equipment, and the long term, such as next generation systems. The 
time horizon of the chosen strategy will likely influence the domain of the 
solution.  As an example, mishap interventions in the training domain may lend 
themselves to responsive solutions that can be executed almost immediately, 
while manpower, personnel, and human factors engineering interventions may 
require much longer-term strategies. Whether looking at the next day’s  
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operations or the next generation system’s design, safety as an HSI domain is 
produced through the correct balance of manpower, personnel, training, and 
human factors.  
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The reduction or elimination of human error from the operation of DoD 
systems would yield a significant savings in money, personnel, and equipment. 
The DoD-HFACS taxonomy has proven to be a useful tool in determining the 
human factors causes of mishaps and for highlighting areas of concern for safety 
experts. HSI has been shown to be a successful approach during the acquisition 
process in reducing lifecycle costs and maximizing system performance (Booher, 
2003). Given the usefulness of these tools to the DoD, the following research 
objectives were established in order to provide a feedback mechanism between 
current generation aircraft and future aircraft designers and program managers. 
• Identify the human factors causes most often cited in Naval 
Aviation class A flight mishaps. 
• Identify the human factors judged by experts to most likely cause 
Naval Aviation mishaps in the future. 
• Develop a methodology to apply the principles of HSI to mishap 
intervention strategy development and improve the design of next 
generation aircraft. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The organization of this thesis departs slightly from the traditional format. 
In accordance with American Psychological Association standards, a literature 
review, methods, results, and discussion will be covered. However, the three 
research objectives enumerated above will each be treated as its own analytical 
effort. Chapter II provides a comprehensive literature review for all three efforts.  
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The methods, results, and discussion of each of the three efforts comprise 
chapters III-V respectively, and chapter VI will contain the thesis’ overall 
conclusions and recommendations. 
F. DEFINITIONS 
This thesis uses the following definitions taken from the U.S. Navy’s 
OPNAV Instruction 3750.6R, Naval Aviation Safety Program (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2007): 
Naval Aircraft: Aircraft of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Naval Reserve, U.S. Marine 
Corps, and U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. 
Naval Aviation Mishap: An unplanned event, or series of events, directly 
involving Naval Aircraft or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that results in either 
of the following:  
1. Damage in the amount of $20,000 or more to Naval Aircraft or 
UAVs, other aircraft (DoD or non-DoD), or property (DoD or non-
DoD).  
2. A reportable injury of bodily harm, such as a cut, fracture, burn, or 
poisoning received while involved with Naval Aircraft or UAV 
resulting from a single or one-day exposure to an external force, 
toxic substance, or physical agent, and result in a fatality, 
permanent total disability, permanent partial disability, or injuries 
resulting in the loss of five or more workdays (not including the day 
of injury).  
Flight Mishaps (FM):  Those mishaps which result in $20,000 or more 
damage to a DoD aircraft or UAV or the loss of a DoD aircraft or unmanned 
aerial vehicle– when intent for flight for DoD aircraft or UAV existed at the time of 
the mishap. 
Naval Aviation Class A Severity Mishap: A Class A mishap is one in which 
the total cost of damage to property, aircraft, or UAV exceeds $1,000,000, a 
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Naval Aircraft is destroyed or missing, or any fatality or permanent total disability 
results from the direct involvement of Naval Aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicle.1  
Loss of a UAV is not a Class A unless the cost is $1,000,000 or greater.  
Naval Aviation Class B Severity Mishap: A Class B mishap is one in which 
the total cost of damage to property, aircraft, or UAV is more than $200,000 but 
less than $1,000,000, or a permanent partial disability or the hospitalization of 
three or more personnel results.  
Naval Aviation Class C Severity Mishap: A Class C mishap is one in which 
the total cost of damage to property, aircraft, or UAV is $20,000 or more, but less 
than $200,000, or results in an injury requiring five or more lost workdays.  
 
                                            
1 A message from the Naval Safety Center dated 06 Oct 2009 recently updated the dollar 
amount thresholds for class A, B, and C mishaps to $2 million, $500 thousand, and $50 thousand 
respectively, while leaving other criteria such as fatalities, permanent disabilities, lost workdays, 
and aircraft destruction unchanged (Commander, Naval Safety Center, 2009). The previous 
definitions listed above applied to all data and studies mentioned in this thesis.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
When traditional news organizations report on a tragic aircraft accident, 
two broad categories of causation are generally cited: mechanical failure and 
pilot error. Some solace can be found in the former, because we assume a 
thorough investigation will be conducted to determine the exact component that 
failed and that appropriate steps will be taken to ensure it is fixed. In contrast, 
pilot error is a convenient label meant to cover a large number of possible errors 
in judgment, memory, or skill. It neither conveys the true nature of the error, nor 
assures us that similar errors can be prevented in the future. Therefore, pilot 
error is often far more challenging, both to classify and to remedy, than 
mechanical failure. 
B. HUMAN ERROR 
Before one can begin to examine human error, it must first be defined. 
Reason (1990) defined human error as: 
A generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a 
planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its 
intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to 
the intervention of some chance agency.  (p. 9)  
Although it serves as a valid starting point, this definition is a broad 
statement that covers a vast range of actions and behaviors. It does not address 
in any detail the reason the intended outcome was not achieved. This is the heart 
of the matter for all mishap investigators. For safety professionals, determining 
why errors are made is the first step towards preventing them in the future.  
The first step towards determining why errors occur is to understand the 
different types of human error. The two major categories of errors are failures in 
planning and failures in execution. In other words, the two principle reasons an 
 12
error causes the desired outcome to not be achieved is either due to the 
selection of an inappropriate course of action, or due to some failure in the 
execution of a course of action (Reason, 1990).  
The form of error resulting from selecting an inappropriate course of action 
is called a mistake (Norman, 1982; Reason, 1990). These planning errors are 
sometimes referred to as “honest mistakes.” It is important to recognize that for 
mistakes, the quality of the execution of the selected course of action is not what 
doomed the decision maker to an undesired outcome; but rather the selection of 
that particular course of action in the first place. Consider the example of a pilot 
who crashes while attempting a landing at an airport that is reporting severe 
weather conditions. Piloting skills likely had little influence on the tragic outcome. 
The true error was in the decision to attempt a landing in known adverse weather 
conditions. When the plan itself is flawed, only with a reliance on blind chance or 
Providence can one expect a positive result. 
The second form of error is one of execution, normally called a slip. 
Norman (1982) distinguished between mistakes and slips by simply stating, “an 
error in the intention is called a ‘mistake.’ An error in carrying out the intention is 
called a ‘slip’” (Norman, 1982, p. 378). One type of error in execution related to a 
slip is a called a lapse. A lapse is a failure of memory storage or retrieval that 
causes the execution of a course of action to go awry. While slips may be 
thought of as errors of commission, which are potentially observable by an 
outsider, lapses are typically errors of omission, which may not be apparent (at 
least immediately) to anyone but the individual (Reason, 1990). A pilot who 
activates the engine start switch for the left engine instead of the right is guilty of 
a slip. In contrast, the pilot who fails to lower the landing gear on final approach 
has experienced a lapse. The important distinction of slips and lapses from 
mistakes is that the quality of the plan was not responsible for the outcome, only 
the failure in its execution. 
Although defining mistakes, slips, and lapses is sufficient for a theoretical 
understanding of human error, it is inadequate for the practical application of 
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mishap investigation and intervention. Simply dividing human error into failures of 
planning and execution lacks the fidelity needed to provide meaningful insight 
into preventing the next mishap. Failures in planning and execution can be 
further divided into more specific errors. Additionally, no mention has yet been 
made about the conditions surrounding the error and their influence on the 
individual. External forces and actors could, in fact, set the stage for judgment or 
execution errors. In search of a more complete picture of human error, several 
theories and frameworks have evolved to address these concerns. 
C. HUMAN ERROR THEORIES AND FRAMEWORKS 
Although many studies of cognitive psychology and human error have 
produced a wide range of theories and frameworks, by and large they are more 
suited to academic vice practical purposes (Freud, 1901; Norman & Shallice, 
1980; Wickens, 1980). To be useful for mishap investigation and intervention, a 
framework should not require an investigator to use speculation or intuition into 
the deep processes inside the human mind (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). An 
ideal taxonomy for accident investigation would take both cognitive and external 
influences into account. To be practical, this framework would guide an 
investigator through all possible sources of error in a logical and methodical way. 
The genesis of a framework that could be practically applied by line managers 
and supervisors began in the field of industrial safety. 
D. DOMINO THEORY 
In 1931, Heinrich published the first set of principles on industrial safety in 
a book titled, Industrial Accident Prevention. Heinrich’s ten axioms of industrial 
safety were purported to be self-evident truths about the nature of accidents, 
their causation, and the nature of man-machine interfaces (Heinrich, Peterson, & 
Roos, 1980). Although subsequent research in the field of industrial safety has 
called a few of the axioms into question, their basic principles served as the 
foundation for much of the work that followed (Heinrich, Peterson, & Roos, 1980). 
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Indeed, the DoD-HFACS taxonomy of human error (discussed in detail later) 
owes its roots to the early work of Heinrich. 
The first of Heinrich’s axioms on industrial safety is perhaps the most 
important, because it is the basis for many frameworks that followed. It states: 
The occurrence of an injury invariably results from a completed 
sequence of factors– the last one of these being the accident itself. 
The accident in turn is invariably caused or permitted directly by the 
unsafe act of a person and/or a mechanical or physical hazard. 
(Heinrich, Peterson, & Roos, 1980, p. 21) 
Although this axiom does not appear groundbreaking on its surface, it 
does establish the underlying mechanics of the sequence of an accident. Later 
dubbed the “Domino theory,” the analogy provides insight into where to look for 
the cause of an accident and where to intervene in order to prevent its 
reoccurrence. In Heinrich et al.’s (1980) early model (Figure 3), the first domino 
was ancestry and the social environment, which influenced the second domino, 
the faults of a person. These faults, in turn, constituted reasons for committing 
unsafe acts (third domino), which led to the accident (fourth domino), and 
ultimately, the injury (fifth domino). The early Domino model claimed that the 
unsafe acts and mechanical hazards domino was the lynchpin, which if removed 
would effectively interrupt the sequence of falling dominos and prevent their 




Figure 3.   Heinrich’s Domino Theory of Accident Causation (From: Heinrich, 
Peterson, & Roos, 1980, p.22) 
Bird (1974) adapted Heinrich et al.’s Domino theory and revised the levels 
of the five dominos (see Figure 4). In Bird’s version, the first domino represented 
lack of control by management. This inadequate control allows an environment in 
which basic causes of accidents can happen (second domino), such as human, 
environmental, and job-related factors. These basic causes are the origins of the 
immediate causes (third domino), which lead to accidents (fourth domino), and 
ultimately injury and damage (fifth domino). Although immediate causes are the 
unsafe acts that directly cause an accident, Bird calls them symptoms of the 
underlying causes in dominos one and two. As Bird states, “when we attack the 
symptom and do not identify the basic underlying problem, we have not really 
optimized the potential for permanent control” (as cited in Heinrich, Peterson, & 
Roos, 1980, p. 26). 
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Figure 4.   Bird’s Adaptation of Heinrich’s Domino Theory (From: Heinrich, 
Peterson, & Roos, 1980, p.24) 
The Domino theory provided an important model for accident investigation 
in the field of industrial safety. The analogy of falling dominos illustrates that 
accidents do not have a single cause. Every event does not happen in isolation, 
but rather takes it cue from decisions and practices higher in the organizational 
structure. Without expanding the scope of accident analysis, safety professionals 
and managers would be doomed to the futile practice of treating symptoms 
instead of identifying and addressing the root causes. The need to address the 
root causes of accidents has become particularly important, as industrial 
processes and equipment have become more complex.  
E. REASON’S “SWISS CHEESE” MODEL 
Reason’s (1990) book, Human Error, is generally regarded as the seminal 
work on the subject of human error in the last twenty years. The focus of 
Reason’s study is on what he calls “defended systems.” These are complex 
machines, systems, and processes in which automatic safety devices have been 
incorporated to reduce the occurrence of mishaps. The added complexity of 
safety mechanisms generally requires the failure of more than one factor (human 
or mechanical) to result in a mishap. As Reason (1990) states, mishaps “…arise 
from the unforeseen and usually unforeseeable concatenation of several diverse 
events, each one necessary but singly insufficient” (p. 197). 
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1. Errors and Violations 
Reason (1990, 1997) classifies the factors that contribute to mishaps into 
two categories: errors and violations. Although human error is most often the 
focus of discussion in mishaps, violations are another method by which humans 
contribute to mishaps. While error includes the unsafe acts due to inattention or 
poor decision making, violations are those acts committed in defiance of 
established rules, regulations, or safe practices (Reason, 1990). That the 
departure from established norms was not done with the intention of causing 
damage is an important distinction. Reason (1990) labels these transgressions 
as sabotage, which is not normally a factor in accident investigation. Instead, 
violations are willful deviations from the rules that do not possess the goal of a 
destructive outcome.  
Violations are divided into two types: routine and exceptional. Routine 
violations arise from the natural propensity of human beings to take the shortest 
path between two points (Reason, 1990). A task sequence that is viewed as 
overly lengthy and complex by an operator will likely be shortened to suit his or 
her opinion of how it should be done. An indifferent environment and a lack of 
enforcement of the rules allow this behavior to flourish. If the police choose not to 
ticket every driver who exceeds the posted speed limit by five miles per hour, 
drivers will naturally assume the practice is tolerated. Furthermore, in the 
absence of negative consequences, it is likely that drivers will soon be testing the 
level of acceptance of a ten mile per hour violation.  
Another possible cause of routine violations is necessity. If established 
procedures or resources prevent the completion of the assigned task, goal-
oriented operators will find a way to complete it, even if it involves the violation of 
procedures. In this case, there is no malicious intent or thrill seeking involved. 
These violators are hard-working individuals faced with overcoming an 
impossible task. Unfortunately, as the rules are circumvented, the new unwritten 
procedure becomes the accepted one, further eroding the legitimacy of written 
procedures. 
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Exceptional violations are another instance of an individual who knowingly 
acts in defiance of the rules. The label as “exceptional” derives from the 
infrequent and often unique occurrence rather than the magnitude by which a 
rule was broken. In other words, it is not the heinousness of the violation that 
makes it exceptional, but rather the infrequency of its occurrence (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). An otherwise responsible and competent pilot who executes a 
high-performance takeoff to “show off” for friends and family who are watching is 
guilty of an exceptional violation. Exceptional violations are “out of character” for 
the individual. Thus, their very nature makes them difficult to predict or prevent.  
2. Active and Latent Failures 
Mishap factors, according to Reason (1990, 1997), are also divided into 
active and latent failures. Active failures are those errors and violations 
committed by the operators of the system. Pilots, air traffic controllers, and 
surgeons are examples of individuals that are responsible for committing active 
failures. As the front-line personnel, their actions (or lack of) usually have 
immediate results and are most proximal to the mishap. Historically, these 
operators have borne the lion’s share of the blame for mishaps. Investigators of 
the past were often content with establishing what unsafe act caused the mishap 
and identifying the individual responsible (Reason, 1997). Ending the search for 
mishap casual factors at this point made intervention strategies relatively 
simplistic: replace the operator, add a new rule or procedure, and carry on as 
before. Only in the last 30 years, have safety professionals begun to view front-
line operators as the inheritors of unsafe designs, construction, maintenance, 
and management (Reason, 1990). These surrounding conditions or “latent 
failures” are now being viewed with more scrutiny.  
Latent failures differ from active failures in that they usually occur long 
before the mishap (Reason, 1990, 1997). Unsafe system design, inadequate 
maintenance, lack of resources, and poor supervision are examples of latent 
failures. Although latent failures may result from poor decisions, that is not 
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always the case. Resource allocation decisions may have been made upon 
sound reasoning at the time, yet they may ultimately result in tragedy as the 
system or process evolves over time (Reason, 1997). Latent failures are the 
natural result of complexity and thus are not likely to be easily eliminated. 
Reason (1990, 1997) drew an analogy from latent failures to pathogens in 
the human body. Normally, automatic self-protect measures keep the pathogens 
and latent failures at bay. These conditions can lie dormant for days, weeks, 
months, or years until triggered by the correct set of circumstances. When these 
conditions align, the results are disastrous. It is important to realize that although 
active failures are generally unique to a specific accident, latent failures may go 
undetected and sow the seeds of several mishaps until discovered and corrected 
(Reason, 1997). 
The King’s Cross fire in the London Underground in 1987 is a tragic 
example of the role latent failures play in mishaps. Discarded smoking material 
from a passenger exiting the underground station on a wooden escalator started 
a fire that resulted in the death of 31 people (Fennell, 1988). A buildup of grease 
and refuse in the tracks of the escalator provided the tinder that fed flames that 
quickly spread out of control. Although 45% of the 400 fires recorded in the 
previous 20 years in the London Underground occurred on these escalators, it 
was only two years earlier that smoking was banned after a fire at the Oxford 
Circus station (Fennell, 1988). In spite of knowledge that passengers regularly 
ignored the ban, the wooden escalators continued in service until the aftermath 
of the King’s Cross fire. Furthermore, the running tracks of the escalators had not 
been cleaned of grease or debris since their installation in 1939 (Fennell, 1988). 
These latent conditions undoubtedly contributed to numerous smaller fires until 
finally corrected in the wake of the King’s Cross disaster. 
Reason (1990) described a model for active and latent failures within the 
context of a production enterprise. He stated the production model applies 
equally well to manufacturing and production facilities as it does to the 
transportation industry. In either case, the model shares five basic elements: 
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decision makers, line management, preconditions, productive activities, and 
defenses. To Reason, these elements are each represented by several barriers 
to mishaps stacked against one another. As illustrated in Figure 5, latent failures 
are likely at the corporate decision maker, line management, psychological 
precursor, and defense levels. Active failures occur as unsafe acts during 
production activities and as inadequate defenses. Active and latent failures are 
represented by holes in the barriers to mishaps that must align under a specific 
set of circumstances to produce an accident. The barriers to mishaps and the 
holes of active and latent failures have since been represented as slices of Swiss 
cheese. This “Swiss cheese model” became the underpinning for Wiegmann and 
Shappell’s (1997) HFACS taxonomy discussed in the next section. 
 
Figure 5.   Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (After: Reason, 1990, p. 208) 
F. HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
(HFACS) 
Using earlier work by Heinrich et al. (1980) and Reason (1990), Shappell 
and Wiegmann (1997) set out to construct a comprehensive taxonomy of 
accident causation for use by the Navy and Marine Corps for aircraft accident 
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investigation and analysis. This classification scheme was originally called the 
“Taxonomy of Unsafe Operations” and has since been expanded and renamed 
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). The Defense 
Safety Oversight Council’s Aviation Safety Improvement Task Force adopted the 
HFACS taxonomy, and adapted it to create a standardized method of 
investigating, collecting, analyzing, and sharing human factor mishap data across 
all of the U.S. armed services (Department of Defense, 2005). The resulting 
taxonomy is called the Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (DoD-HFACS) and is the mandated human error 
classification system for investigating all DoD mishaps (Department of Defense, 
2005).  
DoD-HFACS, like the Domino theory, holds that mishaps are the result of 
a sequence of events and failures throughout an organization (Department of 
Defense, 2005). DoD-HFACS also uses Reason’s (1990) concept of latent 
failures as the precipitating influences of unsafe acts that directly cause 
accidents. Specifically, DoD-HFACS looks to define and further categorize 
Reason’s latent failures in order to aid accident investigation and analysis. To do 
this, DoD-HFACS identifies four layers of active and latent failures: acts, 
preconditions, supervision, and organizational influences. Figure 6 illustrates 
these four layers, and how latent failures can align to allow a mishap.  
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Figure 6.   The HFACS Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation Adapted 
From Reason, 1990 (After: Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003, p.47) 
Each layer is made up of several categories of related errors and failures. 
These categories are further parsed into individual failures, called nanocodes, 
which classify the specific instance of human error. It is the nanocodes that will 
be identified as the contributors to a mishap. Safety professionals can then 
compile these nanocodes across mishaps and over time for further in-depth 
analysis. Figure 7 shows the four levels and their corresponding categories in 
DoD-HFACS. Each level and its respective categories will be briefly discussed. 
For a complete listing and description of the 147 DoD-HFACS nanocodes, see 




Figure 7.   DoD-HFACS Taxonomy (From: Department of Defense, 2005, p.5) 
1. Acts 
The first level of DoD-HFACS (see Figure 8) is the one most closely 
associated with mishaps. Acts are the final actions or failures of action that can 
be said to be most directly responsible for the accident. It is these acts that 
traditional mishap investigation techniques have focused on most intensely 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). DoD-HFACS, like Reason (1990), divides acts 
into two broad categories, errors and violations. Errors refer to well-intentioned 
actions that did not achieve the desired outcome, whereas violations are actions 
that are in defiance of established rules and regulations (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
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2000). The error category is further broken down into three types: skill-based 
errors, judgment and decision-making errors, and perception errors. 
 
Figure 8.   Categories of Acts of Operators (From: Department of Defense, 
2005, p. 6) 
a. Errors 
(1) Skill-based Errors. Skill-based errors are those that 
occur while an individual is executing a routine and highly practiced task 
(Department of Defense, 2005). The DoD-HFACS identifies six specific skill-
based error nanocodes in the acts level of mishap investigation. Skill-based 
actions, such as driving a car or flying an aircraft are learned behaviors that 
become ingrained, so as to not require active concentration. As such, these 
activities are prone to Reason’s (1990) slips and lapses of attention and memory 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Attention failures, or slips, are common in 
everyday life. One common example is a driver who wanders out of his or her 
lane on the highway while tuning the radio or adjusting the air conditioning. 
Recent legislation restricting or prohibiting the use of cell phones or texting while 
driving are examples of interventions aimed at preventing these types of skill-
based errors.  
Memory failures, or lapses, are another example of skill-
based error. Missing checklist items, losing one’s place, and forgetting intentions 
are common lapses (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Memory failures can range  
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from innocuously forgetting to take the trash can out to the street on the 
appointed trash day, to tragically forgetting to lower the landing gear on final 
approach.   
(2) Judgment and Decision-Making Errors. Judgment and 
decision-making errors are those in which the errors are committed in the 
planning or selection of a course of action. This error type is what Reason (1990) 
called a mistake. Pilots who choose to perform the wrong emergency 
procedures, or who do not properly assess the risks of a selected course of 
action are guilty of these “honest mistakes.” DoD-HFACS contains six nanocodes 
to capture specific judgment and decision-making errors in mishaps. 
It is important for safety professionals to distinguish between 
decision-making and skill-based errors, because correct identification is 
necessary to construct the proper intervention. If a pilot fails to perform a 
procedure correctly, that is a skill-based error. If the procedure selected by the 
pilot is inappropriate to the situation at hand, then a decision-making error has 
occurred. In the former case, memorization, practice, and repetition might be the 
remedy. In the latter, deeper understanding of the aircraft systems, scenario-
based decision training, and experience would likely be more effective 
intervention strategies. 
(3) Perception Errors. The third type of error is not one of 
planning or execution, but rather perception. A pilot’s plan and execution both 
hinge on the quality of the information available. If the pilot’s view of reality differs 
from ground truth, it should be no surprise that errors are likely. In aviation, 
spatial disorientation that arises from visual or vestibular illusions often cause 
pilots to misjudge altitudes, airspeeds, distances, and even which direction is up. 
Although these illusions are well known and the subject of an extensive amount 
of training, mishaps continue to occur from pilots’ incorrect responses to them 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). DoD-HFACS incorporates a single nanocode to 
account for these incorrect responses to perceptual illusions. 
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b. Violations 
The final category of active failures at the acts level is violations. 
Unlike errors, violations do not occur due to lapses in memory, attention, or 
judgment. Instead, violations result from intentionally breaking a known rule or 
instruction (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). DoD-HFACS incorporates a nanocode 
for each of the three different types of violations.  
The first type of violation is what is referred to as a “work-around 
violation.” In this violation, the risks associated with committing the violation were 
considered, and committing the violation was determined to be the best solution 
(Department of Defense, 2005). This violation may be unique to a particular 
mishap or may be common within a community that recognizes that the 
established rules do not permit the best course of action. One example of when 
work-around violations can occur is when written maintenance procedures are 
incorrect or inadequate. When faced with this scenario, experienced 
maintenance personnel may choose to do what they perceive is necessary even 
if it is in conflict with the written instructions. 
The other two types of violations are routine and exception 
violations as previously defined by Reason (1990). It is important to note the 
difference between work-around violations and routine violations. Although work-
around violations may take place routinely, the consequences and risks 
associated with them have been considered. In spite of these risks, the individual 
chose to continue in order to accomplish the mission. Routine violations, in 
contrast, needlessly expose the aircraft and crew to risks that serve no greater 
purpose (Department of Defense, 2005). The case of ignoring steps in a written 
maintenance procedure merely to “cut a few corners” and save time would be 
classified as a routine violation if it occurred regularly. The lack of necessity is 
what distinguishes this case from a work-around violation. 
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2. Preconditions 
Although determining the acts that caused an accident are important, 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) liken these acts to the symptoms of a disease. 
Developing interventions for unsafe acts is likely to be as effective as treating the 
symptoms of a chronic illness. To understand the root cause and intervene 
where it will be most successful, safety professionals must look farther upstream. 
The preconditions that preface the unsafe acts in a mishap are critical to 
examine. Their influence may range from very little to the point, in extreme 
cases, where it would have actually been surprising if an accident had not 
occurred. 
To capture the numerous factors that set the stage for unsafe acts, DoD-
HFACS lists 92 nanocodes at the preconditions level, over 60% of the entire set 
of 147 nanocodes. The preconditions level (see Figure 9) takes into account a 
variety of influences that are categorized into three main types: condition of 
individuals, personnel factors, and environmental factors. In many cases, 
environmental and personnel factors strongly influence the condition of 
individuals. For example, a precondition of self-imposed stress may adversely 
affect a cognitive factor in the condition of the individual. In this way, it is easy to 
see that the interaction of several preconditions may be the circumstances that 
set the stage for an unsafe act. 
 
Figure 9.   Categories of Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (From: Department of 
Defense, 2005) 
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a. Condition of Individuals 
The condition of an individual has a strong influence on the 
outcome of any operation that individual may be performing. Laws against driving 
under the influence of drugs and alcohol are logically based upon such a notion. 
However, the range of factors that goes into making up the condition of the 
individual are perhaps more diverse than one might first think. DoD-HFACS 
identifies five broad categories that affect individual performance: cognitive 
factors, psycho-behavioral factors, adverse physiological states, physical/mental 
limitations, and perceptual factors. Each of these categories, in turn, has a list of 
nanocodes detailing the specific factors of influence. 
(1) Cognitive Factors. The eight nanocodes associated 
with cognitive factors are concerned with the attention or awareness failures that 
affect perception or performance (Department of Defense, 2005). These failures 
include: not paying attention, paying too much attention to the wrong thing, and 
distraction or interruption during a task. Essentially, these types of failures are 
related to the mental processing of information. 
(2) Psycho-Behavioral Factors. Whereas cognitive 
factors concern mental processes, the 15 nanocodes of psycho-behavioral 
factors are related to personality traits, problems, and disorders of individuals 
(Department of Defense, 2005). These factors range from clinical psychological 
disorders, to overconfidence, and motivational burnout. The psycho-behavioral 
factors category covers a lot of conditions that, in essence, try to determine the 
motivation behind an individual’s actions. This category is often used to explain 
acts in the decision-making and violations categories and determine why the 
individuals made the choices they did. 
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(3) Adverse Physiological States. The 16 nanocodes of 
adverse physiological states address the medical and physiological factors that 
degrade human performance (Department of Defense, 2005). These factors 
include potentially debilitating states such as G-induced loss of consciousness, 
dehydration, hypoxia, jet lag, and others. As might be expected, these episodes 
can physically prevent a pilot or operator from performing at the level required for 
safety. 
(4) Physical/Mental Limitations. The five nanocodes that 
encompass physical and mental limitations refers to an individual’s capacity to 
cope with a given situation. These limitations can be physical in nature, such as 
anthropomorphic body size or biomechanical strength and reach. If a pilot lacks 
the physical strength to manipulate manual flight control surfaces when the 
hydraulic-assisted control function fails, it will come as no surprise when that pilot 
fails to maintain aircraft control. 
Mental limitations are also important to consider in the 
condition of individuals. One such limitation is memory capacity. If the emergency 
procedures that must be committed to memory are too lengthy, it is likely that 
steps will be forgotten and a tragic end will follow. 
Although these physical and mental limitations may seem 
similar to those found in cognitive factors and adverse physiological states, there 
is an important distinction. Physical and mental limitations are more permanent in 
nature. Whereas G-induced loss of consciousness and distraction are temporary 
and often preventable factors, the memory capacity or physical strength of an 
individual is not quickly or easily changed. 
(5) Perceptual Factors. The perceptual factors category 
is comprised of 11 nanocodes that catalogue degraded sensory inputs 
(Department of Defense, 2005). These include recognized and unrecognized 
spatial disorientation and various other vestibular and visual illusions. The acts 
level also addresses the issue of perception. The difference is that at the  
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precondition level, these perceptual factors are the illusions themselves, while 
the perception error at the acts level refers to the operator’s incorrect response to 
them. 
b. Personnel Factors 
Just as the condition of the individual can influence whether that 
individual commits an unsafe act, there are some things individuals do to 
themselves that adversely affect their own condition (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2001). These are called personnel factors in DoD-HFACS. The two categories 
within personnel factors are: coordination/communication/planning factors and 
self-imposed stress.  
(1) Coordination/Communication/Planning Factors. This 
category can be thought of as the group personnel factors that influence the 
condition of individuals. These 12 nanocodes cover a range of activities in which 
aircrew, air traffic controllers, and other personnel outside the cockpit must 
effectively communicate and coordinate their activities for safe and successful 
operations. The Navy’s Crew Resource Management (CRM) program consists of 
annual training on the specific skills needed to be effective. These skills include 
decision-making, assertiveness, mission analysis, communication, leadership, 
adaptability and situational awareness. Failures related to these skills often 
adversely affect the condition of individuals, causing confusion, distraction, and 
task over-saturation.  
(2) Self-imposed Stress. Self-imposed stress is the 
category that identifies the factors that individuals contribute to their own 
condition. As opposed to physical or mental limitations, these factors are 
generally temporary and preventable. An individual who chooses to stay up late, 
subsist on candy bars and beer, and has never seen the inside of a gym is not 
likely to be mentally and physically sharp for work in the morning. DoD-HFACS 
has six nanocodes to catalogue these stressors that influence the conditions of 
an individual and contribute to mishaps.  
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c. Environmental Factors 
Beyond the influences individuals have on their own condition, 
external forces also play a role. DoD-HFACS identifies two broad categories of 
environmental factors that can influence the condition of individuals and promote 
unsafe acts: physical environment and technological environment. 
(1) Physical Environment. Physical environment 
encompasses a wide range of factors that define the space in which operations 
take place. These include weather conditions, lighting, temperature stressors, 
noise, vibrations, and the operations of other aircraft in the vicinity. It is important 
to note that these environmental factors can be both external and internal to the 
immediate environment of the operator. Smoke and fumes or heat stress in the 
cockpit are just as much a danger as extreme outside temperatures and visual 
obscurants such as clouds, dust, and haze. DoD-HFACS incorporates 11 
nanocodes related to these factors in the physical environment. 
(2) Technological Environment. Eight nanocodes in DoD-
HFACS cover the mishap contributors that are traditionally the focus of human 
factors engineering. This field encompasses the physical and cognitive interfaces 
of human and machine. Just a few examples of human-machine interface design 
problems include whether displays are readable in bright sunlight, if controls are 
within reach of the intended operator, and if the operating system is intuitive to 
use. Issues such as these represent the types of barriers that must be overcome 
by the operator to use the system. However, these technology issues may not be 
present for every user. It is the mismatch of user and system that is at the heart 
of the problem. Poor design is a great example of one of Reason’s (1990) latent 
failures that lie dormant until the right set of circumstances occurs before it 





Like Reason (1990), DoD-HFACS identifies latent failures at the 
supervisory level. The reach of supervisors far exceeds that of individual 
operators. While one error by a pilot may cause one mishap, one supervisory 
failure may set the stage for many. The goal of investigating the failures of 
managers and supervisors is not to relieve pilots and operators of accountability 
for their actions (Department of Defense, 2005). Rather, it is to ensure that the 
leadership provided is adequate, appropriate, and responsive. DoD-HFACS 
identifies four categories at the supervisory level that may contain latent failures: 
inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct a 
known problem, and supervisory violations (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10.   Categories of Unsafe Supervision (From: Department of Defense, 
2005) 
a. Inadequate Supervision 
Every supervisor is tasked to provide the tools of success to those 
under them (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Guidance, training, mentorship, and 
oversight are critical functions of any supervisor. The lack of any of these 
essential elements can easily allow the operators to function in an unsafe 
manner. If a pilot is not provided the proper training or policy procedures for 
dealing with likely emergency scenarios, it should not be surprising when a 
mishap occurs. Likewise, a supervisor who does not stay in touch with what his 
aircrews are doing has little chance to develop appropriate policy, provide helpful 




Inadequate supervision that fails to identify hazards, control risks, and provide 
appropriate guidance and oversight are captured by six nanocodes in DoD-
HFACS (Department of Defense, 2005).  
b. Planned Inappropriate Operations 
The category of planned inappropriate operations covers a range of 
decision-making failures by supervisors. Included in the seven nanocodes in this 
section of DoD-HFACS are choices that must be made by supervisors on a daily 
basis. Supervisors must regularly assign tasks to individuals and individuals to 
function together as a team. These assignments should be based on several 
factors including: experience, personality, knowledge, skills, and qualifications. 
Selection of personnel, as well as the tempo of operations established, should 
also take into account the condition of the operators including factors such as 
illness, distraction, and fatigue level. A supervisor, who assigns two 
inexperienced crewmembers a difficult and unfamiliar mission, effectively sets 
them up for failure (Department of Defense, 2005). Large differences in rank or 
authority and conflicting personalities can also lead to an increased chance of 
human error. An effective supervisor must consider all of these factors when 
assigning individuals to teams and tasks. 
c. Failure to Correct Known Problem 
A special type of failure at the supervisory level is the failure to 
correct a known problem. This failure occurs when the supervisor was aware of 
an unsafe condition in the form of equipment, personnel, or policy and allowed 
operations to continue anyway. DoD-HFACS has two nanocodes in this category: 
personnel management and operational management. Personnel management 
refers to a failure to identify and correct inadequate or risk-seeking pilots. When 
such a pilot is involved in a mishap, usually no one seems surprised (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000). Yet even without the benefit of hindsight, indicators of thrill-
seeking or unskilled pilots are often visible to supervisors who fail to take action. 
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The operations management nanocode is designed to capture the failure of 
supervisors to provide guidance and correct unsafe practices or conditions. A 
failure of supervisors to step in and correct these unsafe practices implies they 
are condoned. For this reason, routine violations at the acts level are likely to be 
closely associated with this type of failure. 
d. Supervisory Violations 
The last category in the supervisory level is supervisory violations. 
Like violations at the acts level, this category relates to willful disregard for rules, 
regulations, and higher authority (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). DoD-HFACS 
lists four nanocodes at this level. One such failure type is the supervisor’s 
authorization of operators to conduct missions for which they are not qualified. A 
supervisor that allows a pilot who has not passed his annual safe for flight 
checkride to continue flying is one such example. Perhaps the most egregious 
case is when a supervisor specifically directs a subordinate to violate a 
regulation. Whether born from a risk-seeking personality or an overinflated ego, a 
supervisor with a penchant for disregarding established rules and regulations is 
inviting disaster. 
4. Organizational Influences 
The top level of failures in DoD-HFACS is organizational influences. The 
organizational level is distinguished from the supervisory level by its greater 
sphere of influence. Whereas an operator may have one or two levels of 
supervision that directly influence his or her daily operations, the organizational 
level represents a broader perspective. This level consists of the top level of 
leadership at the corporate headquarters or military service branch. Reason 
(1990) called this level the “decision makers” because it represented the highest 
echelons of leadership who make the large-scale choices on organizational 
policies, missions, and the allocation of resources. Although the decisions made 
at this level are sometimes difficult to directly attribute to the causation of a 
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mishap, they certainly provide the circumstances and environment in which one 
can occur. Figure 11 illustrates the three categories of organizational influences 
in DoD-HFACS: resource/acquisition management, organizational climate, and 
organizational process. 
 
Figure 11.   Categories of Organizational Influence (From: Department of 
Defense, 2005) 
a. Resource/Acquisition Management 
The nine nanocodes of DoD-HFACS for resource/acquisition 
management cover failures in top-level decisions regarding manning, personnel 
selection, equipment design and condition, and funding priorities. Military 
services often compete with each other for increasingly scarce congressional 
funds. As a result, not every desire of the service is fulfilled. Decision makers 
must perform tradeoffs among various competing priorities in order to effectively 
carry out their mission. However, those tradeoffs sometimes come at a price. If 
the Navy is unable to afford to man their ships with enough Sailors, it is easy to 
see how accidents can occur. Likewise, the type of personnel assigned to a ship 
can greatly influence its propensity for a mishap. Manning a ship entirely with 
“green” recruits would also be a recipe for disaster. Finally, if the Navy cannot 
afford to properly maintain the ship or build one appropriate to the assigned 
mission, success will not be forthcoming. The challenge for senior leaders is that 
resource allocation decisions that are fiscally sound may, in fact, be latent 
failures awaiting their opportunity to contribute to a mishap. 
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b. Organizational Climate 
Organizational climate refers to the characteristics that define how 
an organization conducts business. The five nanocodes in DoD-HFACS contain 
such traits as organizational structure, incentives, beliefs, values, and culture. 
While some policies and structures are formalized, such as a chain of command, 
others, such as what types of individuals get selected for promotion, are not. 
Although sometimes difficult to quantify, the policies and practices of an 
organization reveal the underlying culture that drives its behavior. As individuals 
are influenced by that culture, it can be either a positive or a negative force. 
Identifying those elements of the organizational climate that might push 
individuals into a corner and force an ill-fated decision is the purpose of this 
category of DoD-HFACS. 
c. Organizational Process 
The final category at the organizational level is called organizational 
process. These six nanocodes of DoD-HFACS cover the operations, procedures, 
and oversight of the organization (Department of Defense, 2005). The operations 
category refers to the pace of operations, schedules, and time pressure as set at 
the highest levels. Deployment schedules that leave little time for long-term 
maintenance, upkeep, or training are an example of an operational process that 
might lead to the preconditions for a mishap. The procedures category refers to 
the standards, rules, and regulations established by higher authority as the “right 
way” to do business. The consequences of errors encoded in these procedures 
are not only tragic in their own right, but undermine the confidence individuals 
place in such regulations in the future. Finally, the oversight category refers to 
organizational-level monitoring and management of risk. This includes safety 
programs and independent inspections by observers outside the normal chain of 
command. The emphasis, or lack thereof, an organization places on oversight 
can have a significant influence on the quality and safety of the work environment 
(Department of Defense, 2005). 
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G. USING DOD-HFACS IN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
In order to apply DoD-HFACS in a mishap investigation, it is generally 
helpful to start at the time of the accident and work backwards (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). Traditionally, this is how accident investigations have been 
performed. As a human error that contributed to a mishap is discovered, it is 
natural to ask why it occurred. Thus, if the investigator identifies an unsafe act, it 
is logical to look for a precondition that led to it. Likewise, supervisory conditions 
might have set the tone that created or allowed the preconditions to exist. Finally, 
the larger organization may have influenced the types of individuals who were 
promoted to supervisory positions or created the culture that rippled down to the 
lower levels, coloring the decisions and actions of all involved.  
Therefore, a prudent investigator should generally look farther up the 
hierarchy of DoD-HFACS to examine if other factors were at play. This begs the 
question of when the search for causal factors should end. Carried to the 
extreme, it can be said that if the Navy chose not to operate any aircraft, it would 
not have any aviation mishaps. Reason (1997) cautioned against the over 
zealous search for contributing factors in mishap investigation. He listed three 
criteria to consider in the determination of contributing factors: a) did the factor 
add to the understanding of the causes or events, b) contribute to the prediction 
of future accidents, or c) contribute to remedial efforts to reduce future 
occurrences of accidents. As these are substantively the goals of any effective 
safety program, it important that investigators are mindful of them as they search 
for casual factors.  
H. APPLICATIONS OF HFACS 
One advantage of HFACS is its ability to comprehensively code data from 
mishap investigations for later analysis. The ultimate goal of any such analysis is 




greatest benefit.  Since its inception, researchers in pursuit of answering 
questions about the nature of aircraft accidents have successfully applied 
HFACS towards that goal.  
Shappell et al. (1999) used HFACS to examine 151 Naval Aviation 
mishaps between 1991 and 1997. Using the findings from the original mishap 
investigations, it was discovered that approximately one third of all mishaps 
involved at least one violation of established rules and regulations. Although this 
was a surprising result to many senior leaders in the Navy, the full severity of the 
problem was not fully realized until a similar analysis of Army and Air Force 
mishaps was conducted. Wiegmann, Shappell, and Fraser (2002) used HFACS 
to reveal that violations were only associated with roughly one quarter of the 
aviation mishaps in the Army, and less than ten percent in the Air Force. This 
comparison brought into sharp relief the culture of tolerance in Naval Aviation for 
bending the rules during those years (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). As a result, 
the Navy and Marine Corps instituted intervention strategies aimed at increasing 
the enforcement of the rules and holding pilots and their commanding officers 
accountable for breaking them. Subsequent HFACS analysis of mishaps 
between 1997 and 2000 revealed a decline in the frequency of violations that 
more closely matched Air Force levels (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Thus, 
HFACS was demonstrated to be useful in diagnosing a safety issue, and 
providing a metric for the measurement of intervention effectiveness. 
The ability of HFACS to capture and categorize types of human error for 
analysis gives researchers the opportunity to ask very specific questions about 
the causes of mishaps and track the effects of interventions over time. In another 
example of this type of analysis, Wiegmann et al. (2005) used HFACS to 
examine mishaps in the general aviation community. This study used mishap 
data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database from 1990 
to 2000, which was then coded into HFACS. The researchers wanted to know 
which unsafe acts were responsible for the largest percentage of accidents, if 
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those percentages changed over time, and if there were differences between the 
unsafe acts associated with fatal and non-fatal accidents.  
Using HFACS, Wiegmann et al. (2005) discovered that skill-based errors 
were identified as a contributor in 80% of all general aviation mishaps. This was 
far above the second-place unsafe act, decision errors, which was identified as a 
contributor in only 30% of mishaps.2 The researchers noted that the relative 
percentage of unsafe acts was stable across time, but there was a distinct 
difference between fatal versus non-fatal accident contributors. The percentage 
of all unsafe acts was the same for both fatal and non-fatal accidents, except for 
violations. Violations were four times more likely to be associated with fatal 
accidents than non-fatal accidents. In practical terms, if a pilot’s violation of the 
rules resulted in an accident, it was far more likely to result in a fatality than not 
(Wiegmann et al., 2005).  
I. SUMMARY 
Human error continues to play a large role in mishaps in Naval Aviation 
and elsewhere. Safety professionals and senior leaders struggle to determine 
where the root problems lie and how best to intervene. Unfortunately, 
intervention strategies are often selected based on unavoidable biases of the 
decision makers. The most recent mishap causes or those that garner the most 
public attention often lead to knee-jerk interventions that may or may not get at 
the underlying problem. Additionally, the intervention strategies developed tend 
to be colored by the experiences of those who generate them. For example, 
engineers tend to develop engineering solutions; training specialists tend to 
develop training solutions, and so on. Finally, it is often difficult to follow up after 
interventions are made to determine if improvements were made. Mishap 
prevention strategies based on facts, not intuition, that can be objectively 
evaluated, stand a much greater chance of long-term effectiveness. 
                                            
2 In mishap reports, several factors are often identified as contributors. Therefore, 
percentages of contributing factors do not add up to 100%. 
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Sometimes, organizational level factors such as culture, resource 
allocation, and equipment design have substantial influences on mishaps. These 
factors are often hard to identify and difficult to change, particularly in the near 
term. New aircraft are only introduced to the fleet every 20 years or so. Although 
designers would ideally like to improve safety in each new generation, it can be 
difficult to remember lessons learned from long ago. If mishap causes can be 
categorized in such a way as to compile like factors together over time, safety 
organizations can assemble and maintain a database of errors that need to be 
addressed by the designers of the next generation of aircraft. 
DoD-HFACS represents a serious effort in identifying and addressing the 
problem of human error. The ability to apply statistical analysis to a standardized 
database across services promises to provide decision makers with better 
information. Additionally, DoD-HFACS affords the ability to examine the 
effectiveness of interventions. Finally, DoD-HFACS can serve as a knowledge 
repository from which future aircraft designers can draw upon to increase the 
safety of their creations. The next chapter will examine DoD-HFACS mishap data 
collected by the Naval Safety Center to determine the most common sources of 
human error in Naval Aviation mishaps. 
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III. EXAMINATION OF NAVAL AVIATION CLASS A MISHAP 
DATA 
A. BACKGROUND 
A naval aviation mishap signals a failure in the Naval Aviation 
Safety Program. It is evidence we failed to detect and eradicate the 
hazards which caused this mishap before it was too late. It is not 
too late, however, to keep it from happening again – which is why 
we investigate aviation mishaps with such vigor. (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2007, p. 6–1) 
The first step in developing mishap intervention strategies is to determine 
what is causing mishaps in the first place. This analytical effort will examine 
recent Naval Aviation mishap data to determine the human errors that are most 
frequently contributing to mishaps. Logically, these errors should be the focus of 
any efforts to develop intervention strategies for current aircraft, but they also 
bear consideration by the designers of future generations of aircraft. Systems 
that fully appreciate and accommodate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
human user can offer more effective defenses against errors. However, in order 
to begin it must be first known where the problem lies. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this analytical effort is to determine the most frequent 
human errors that contribute to Naval Aviation class A mishaps. These tragic 
accidents represent over $1 million in damage, permanent total disability, and/or 
the loss of life. In addition to determining the top error types across all Naval 
Aviation mishaps, analysis will be conducted between services (Navy and Marine 
Corps) and between individual communities within each service (F/A-18 and 
helicopter). This analysis will be conducted in order to ascertain the influence of 
differences in cultures, missions, and aircraft systems on the type of human  
 
 42
factors errors committed. Identifying the differences between communities is 
critical to the design of intervention strategies that are tailor-made to the unique 
circumstances of each platform and service.  
C. DATA COLLECTION 
The Naval Safety Center collects investigation reports from all Naval 
Aviation flight mishaps and maintains a database of casual factors for ongoing 
analysis and evaluation. In support of the adoption of DoD-HFACS by all the 
armed services, the Commander, Naval Safety Center issued a directive 
requiring all future Naval Aviation mishap reports to use DoD-HFACS for the 
coding of causal factors (Commander, Naval Safety Center, 2009). Additionally, 
many of the Naval Safety Center’s mishap database archives are undergoing 
recoding into DoD-HFACS. These two efforts are aimed at building and 
maintaining a repository of mishap data that is comparable across time to 
determine if mishap causal factors change in response to safety efforts. In 
addition, the use of a standardized taxonomy like DoD-HFACS allows data to be 
shared and compared across services. 
Prior to the adoption of DoD-HFACS, Naval Aviation mishap reports were 
coded in a “Who/What/Why” format. The conclusion of the mishap investigation 
report summarized the factors found to be causal to the mishap by listing codes 
for “who” was involved in a particular factor, “what” the factor was, and “why” it 
contributed to the mishap. The Naval Safety Center’s instruction governing the 
investigation of mishaps listed over 550 standard “who” codes to be used to 
identify persons involved with a mishap causal factor. For example, a pilot at the 
controls was coded as “101,” or a commanding officer was coded as “40101.” 
The instruction also listed almost 500 “what” codes for identifying and classifying 
various causal factors. As examples of this coding scheme, “11509” was used to 




Finally, over 300 “why” codes were used to provide a reason the causal factor 
occurred. Examples of these codes include “20413 passed over for promotion” 
and “40202 indecision”.  
The recoding of existing mishap data from “Who/What/Why” into DoD-
HFACS is an ongoing-effort at the Naval Safety Center. Due to the large number 
of mishaps archived, only those mishaps that involve aircraft platforms that will 
be operational for the foreseeable future are being recoded into DoD-HFACS. 
These platforms are fixed-wing strike fighters such as the F/A-18 Hornet and AV-
8B Harrier, and helicopters such as the H-60 Seahawk, H-53 Super Stallion, H-
46 Sea Knight, UH-1 Huey, and AH-1W Cobra. An aviation experimental 
psychologist with a Ph.D. in human factors and extensive experience in HFACS 
who is assigned to the Naval Safety Center is responsible for the recoding 
process. The original flight mishap report, aeromedical analysis, and the final 
endorsement from the Naval Safety Center are used to determine the 
appropriate set of DoD-HFACS nanocodes that are appropriate to each mishap. 
The recoding process began with the most recent data available and is 
proceeding through previous years in order. As of this writing, DoD-HFACS 
conversion has been completed for mishaps going back to FY2000. 
This first analytic effort utilizes all the class A flight mishap data from the 
Naval Safety Center that has been recoded into DoD-HFACS. The resulting data 
pool available for analysis contains 141 Navy and Marine Corps class A flight 
mishaps containing 831 DoD-HFACS nanocodes. Table 1 summarizes the Naval 
Safety Center data available for analysis between FY2000 and FY2008, including 
number of mishaps, flight hours, mishap rate per 100,000 flight hours, and total 






Table 1.   Naval Safety Center Mishap Data 




Aircraft F/A-18 H-60 F/A-18 AV-8B H-53 H-46 UH-1 AW-1W All listed 
Mishaps 47 16 23 24 7 9 8 7 141 
Flight Hours 1,823,327 1,164,774 814,914 321,643 378,971 528,491 196,817 378,750 5,607,687 
Mishap Rate 2.58 1.37 2.82 7.46 1.85 1.70 4.06 1.85 2.51 
DoD-HFACS 
Nanocodes 
227 134 62 129 99 61 70 49 831 
 
D. DATA ANALYSIS METHOD 
Before the data can be analyzed, a reasonable basis of comparison must 
first be established. Comparing across different services, aircraft types, and 
platforms is difficult for several reasons. Differences in aircraft type, numbers, 
mission, culture, and operating environment all play a role in influencing the 
occurrence of mishaps. Additionally, the amount of risk exposure to mishaps is 
greater in services or platforms that fly more often than others. One metric 
commonly used by the Naval Safety Center for quantifying the frequency of 
mishaps is mishap rate. Mishap rate is the average number of mishaps that 
occur per 100,000 hours of flight time. A mishap rate is computed by dividing the 
number of mishaps that have occurred by the number of flight hours flown in a 
given period and multiplying by 100,000. Mishap rates give a relative measure of 
risk of mishaps that can be compared across squadrons, aircraft type, or 
communities and tracked from year to year.  
A metric for comparison of DoD-HFACS errors between communities is a 
difficult challenge. One mishap can have several DoD-HFACS nanocodes, 
categories, and levels associated with it. As an example, imagine a pilot who fails 
to correctly follow a checklist because he is stressed about his upcoming annual 
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performance evaluation from his commanding officer with whom he has had 
repeated personality conflicts. The resulting mishap can be associated with at 
least one nanocode in the acts, preconditions, and supervisory levels. Once 
other factors such as the influence of other crewmembers or air traffic controllers 
are factored in, it is easy to see that there is no set number of nanocodes that 
could be associated with any given mishap. Simply adding up occurrences of 
DoD-HFACS nanocodes to gauge their frequency is insufficient. 
In order to standardize DoD-HFACS error frequency across mishaps, a 
rate similar to mishap rate will be used as a basis of comparison. The number of 
occurrences of a particular DoD-HFACS nanocode divided by the number of 
flight hours in a given period and multiplied by 100,000 yields the rate of 
occurrence of that nanocode per 100,000 flight hours. The rate of any given 
nanocode is likely to be less than the overall mishap rate. This is logical because 
not every nanocode occurs in every mishap. Likewise, if the rates of all the 
individual nanocodes were added together, the result would likely be much 
higher than the mishap rate because each mishap typically has several 
nanocodes associated with it. The purpose of computing an occurrence rate for 
nanocodes is to identify those that occur most frequently in mishaps. Essentially 
this method makes it possible to compute the rate of occurrence of specific error 
types (severe enough to contribute to a mishap) per 100,000 flight hours. Using 
rate per 100,000 flight hours provides a baseline to allow equal comparisons 
regardless of how many aircraft or flight hours a particular community flies. 
Although the rate of occurrence of individual DoD-HFACS nanocodes is 
interesting, their fine granularity can dilute the bigger picture. For example, in the 
skill-based error category at the acts level, two nanocodes are very similar: 
“AE102 Checklist Error” and “AE103 Procedural Error”. This similarity can cause 
a problem with the reliability of mishap investigators to consistently assign the 
appropriate code to a human factors error. If a pilot fails to lower the landing gear 
and a mishap results, that error could be coded as a procedural error. The pilot 
failed to correctly lower the landing gear as a part of the landing procedure. 
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However, the lowering of the landing gear is a step on the landing checklist. It 
follows that this error deserves to be coded as a checklist error. It is easy to see 
how different mishap investigators could possibly code the exact same error as 
two different nanocodes. This illustrates the issue of reliability at the nanocode 
level found by O’Connor (2008).   
One consequence of the poor reliability at the nanocode level is that the 
same basic error type is split between two fine-grained nanocodes. This splitting 
reduces the apparent rate of occurrence between nanocodes. The dilution of this 
error across two nanocodes may cause it to not draw the attention it deserves. 
One technique to minimize this reliability concern is to examine the data at the 
category level. Although the categories lack the fine details of the nanocodes, as 
discussed in the earlier chapter, they do include groups of similar types of human 
error. Additionally, the higher occurrence rates at the category level have been 
shown to exhibit acceptable reliability in the coding process (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2001, 2003).  
Another problem with focusing exclusively on nanocodes is that in the nine 
years of mishap data available, not all of the 147 nanocodes were utilized. In 
fact, 37 nanocodes have yet to be cited in any Navy or Marine Corps mishap 
(e.g., PC510 incapacitating spatial disorientation, SP005 proficiency, etc.) At the 
other end of the spectrum, only 25 nanocodes have been cited in 10 or more of 
the 141 mishaps. This disparity in distribution is troublesome for many statistical 
techniques that rely on the assumptions that causal factors are independent of 
each other and occur with uniform frequency. From the evidence above, it is 
clear nanocode errors do not occur with a uniform distribution of frequency.  
There is also not any evidence to suggest that the underlying errors of 
nanocodes are independent of each other. Recall the scenario wherein a pilot 
who is stressed about an upcoming performance review from a commanding 
officer with whom he doesn’t get along. Assume for the moment that the stressed 
pilot makes a checklist error and forgets to lower the landing gear on final 
approach. The individual nanocodes of “AE102 Checklist Error,” “PC204 
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Emotional State,” and “SI005 Personality Conflict” may be cited in the resulting 
mishap investigation. It is hard to see these errors as independent events, 
because they describe a chain of events that led up to the mishap. In fact, this is 
the very “Domino theory” on which DoD-HFACS is based.  
A Monte Carlo simulation based on a Poisson distribution was considered 
as a means of comparing the occurrence rates of individual DoD-HFACS 
categories between communities and services. As an example, individual 
comparisons of each of the 20 categories between Navy and Marine Corps F/A-
18s by simulation, while tedious, could determine if different occurrence rates are 
statistically significant. Although possibly interesting from a statistician’s point of 
view, safety professionals with limited resources are interested in addressing the 
most pressing issues. While it may be true that communication and coordination 
errors occur statistically more often in helicopters in the Marine Corps than in the 
Navy, the usefulness of this information for prevention is minimal. What is most 
useful to the Naval Safety Center is the fact that it is the number one error in both 
communities. This is actionable information that leaders can use in making 
decisions about safety programs and the allocation of limited resources.  
For the reasons outlined above, the focus of this analytic effort will be to 
show the occurrence rates of DoD-HFACS levels, categories, and nanocodes in 
rank order and compare them for similar communities across the two services. In 
this way, safety professionals will be able to quickly deduce the areas most in 
need of attention and determine if those areas are the same for the Navy and the 
Marine Corps. To illustrate, it is possible that Navy F/A-18 mishaps may result 
from different reasons than is the case in the Marine Corps. These differences 
may represent an interesting phenomenon for further investigation. Differences in 
mission, culture, and operating environment may be the cause, but perhaps there 




In order to analyze the data in a way to be useful to safety professionals in 
the Naval Aviation community, a series of Pareto charts and tables will be 
presented for each community of interest. Pareto charts are used to display the 
order and relative differences between many categories of data. The Pareto 
charts will display the DoD-HFACS levels, categories, and nanocodes organized 
by rate per 100,000 flight hours to highlight the most prevalent factors. 
Communities that will be examined are: 
1. Navy and Marine Corps Combined (F/A-18, AV-8B, H-60, H-53, H-
46, UH-1, & AH-1W) 
2. Overall Navy (F/A-18 & H-60) 
3. Overall Marine Corps (F/A-18, AV-8B, H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-1W) 
4. Navy F/A-18 
5. Marine Corps F/A-18 
6. Navy Helicopter (H-60) 
7. Marine Corps Helicopter (H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-1W) 
For each community a summary table will list basic information such as 
number of mishaps and flight hours between FY2000 and FY2008, mishap rate 
per 100,000 fight hours, total number of DoD-HFACS nanocodes cited, 
nanocode rate per 100,000 flight hours, and a list of the top five DoD-HFACS 
categories by frequency rate. Also included are the percentages of total errors 
that are captured by the top five categories and top twenty nanocodes. These 
figures indicate the percentage of the total number of human errors represented 
by these top-occurring error types. Pareto style charts will illustrate the rate of 
occurrence of DoD-HFACS levels, categories and nanocodes. Due to the large 
number of possible nanocodes, only the twenty most frequently occurring are 
displayed. The Pareto charts for categories and nanocodes also have 
comparison data for the corresponding community in the other service. For 
example, the Navy F/A-18 Top 20 DoD-HFACS Nanocode Pareto chart (Figure 
23) lists the top twenty occurring nanocodes. The top five nanocodes are 
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highlighted for clarity. Additionally, the top five nanocodes for Marine Corps F/A-
18s are highlighted in red and labeled one through five. In this particular case, 
the number five Marine Corps nanocode does not appear in the Navy’s top 20 
list. It is listed inside the red box. Using these Pareto charts, a quick comparison 
is possible between similar communities in the Navy and Marine Corps. 
1. Navy and Marine Corps Combined (F/A-18, AV-8B, H-60, H-53, 
H-46, UH-1, & AH-1W) 
The Navy and Marine Corps combined dataset represents all mishaps 
between FY2000 and FY2008 for which DoD-HFACS nanocodes are available. It 
should be noted that as discussed earlier, not all aircraft operated by the services 
during this time period are represented in this data. Only the platforms listed 
above have had their mishap reports coded into DoD-HFACS. Table 2 
summarizes the data and lists coordination/communication/planning factors as 
the number one category. Figure 12 identifies preconditions as being the level 
where most errors occur. Figure 13 illustrates that coordination/communication/ 
planning factors and skill-based errors are clearly the two leading DoD-HFACS 
categories, each occurring at twice the rate of the third leading cause, psycho-
behavioral factors. Three skill-based error nanocodes: procedural error, over/ 
undercontrol, and breakdown in scan are listed among the top five nanocodes in 
Figure 14. 
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Table 2.   Navy and Marine Corps Combined DoD-HFACS Summary Table 
Mishaps 141 Top 5 DoD-HFACS Categories 




Mishap Rate 2.51 2. SKILL-BASED ERRORS 
Nanocodes 831 3. PSYCHO-BEHAVIORAL FACTORS 
Nanocode Rate 14.82 4. JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING ERRORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 





Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 





Figure 12.   Navy and Marine Corps Combined DoD-HFACS Level Rates 
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Figure 13.   Navy and Marine Corps Combined DoD-HFACS Category Rates 
 
 
Figure 14.   Navy and Marine Corps Combined Top 20 DoD-HFACS Nanocode 
Rates 
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2. Overall Navy (F/A-18 & H-60) 
The overall Navy dataset contains the only two Navy platforms for which 
DoD-HFACS nanocode data exists: the F/A-18 and the H-60. Table 3 
summarizes the data and lists skill-based errors as the number one category. 
Figure 15 identifies preconditions as being the level where most errors occur. 
Figure 16 illustrates that skill-based errors and coordination/communication 
planning factors are not only the top two categories in the Navy, but in the Marine 
Corps as well. In fact, the top seven Navy categories include the top five Marine 
Corps categories. At the nanocode level, the two services share three of the top 
five nanocodes: procedural error, over/undercontrol, and breakdown in scan (see 
Figure 17). 
Table 3.   Overall Navy DoD-HFACS Summary Table 
Mishaps 63 Top 5 DoD-HFACS Categories 
Flight Hours 2,988,101 1. SKILL-BASED ERRORS 




Nanocodes 361 3. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION 
Nanocode Rate 12.08 4. JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING ERRORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 
top 5 categories 
62.0% 5. AWARENESS (COGNITIVE) FACTORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 










Figure 16.   Overall Navy DoD-HFACS Category Rates 
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Figure 17.   Overall Navy Top 20 DoD-HFACS Nanocode Rates 
3. Overall Marine Corps (F/A-18, AV-8B, H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-
1W) 
The overall Marine Corps dataset contains two strike/fighter platforms 
(F/A-18 and AV-8B) and four helicopters (H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-1W). Table 4 
summarizes the data and lists coordination/communication/planning factors as 
the number one category. Figure 18 identifies preconditions as being the level 
where most errors occur.  Figure 19 illustrates that while three of the top five 
categories are shared with the Navy, two categories are not: psycho-behavioral 
factors and violations. As previously mentioned, the two services share three of 
the top five nanocodes: procedural error, over/undercontrol, and breakdown in 
scan. However, one nanocode in the Navy’s top five, decision making, does not 




Table 4.   Overall Marine Corps DoD-HFACS Summary Table 
Mishaps 78 Top 5 DoD-HFACS Categories 
Flight Hours 2,619,586 1. 
COORDINATION/ 
COMMUNICATION/ 
PLANNING FACTORS  
Mishap Rate 2.98 2. SKILL-BASED ERRORS  
Nanocodes 470 3. PSYCHO-BEHAVIORAL FACTORS 
Nanocode Rate 17.94 4. JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING ERRORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 
top 5 categories 
61.5% 5. VIOLATIONS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 






Figure 18.   Overall Marine Corps DoD-HFACS Level Rates 
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Figure 19.   Overall Marine Corps DoD-HFACS Category Rates 
 
Figure 20.   Overall Marine Corps Top 20 DoD-HFACS Nanocode Rates 
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4. Navy F/A-18 
The Navy F/A-18 dataset contains all single and two-seat variants of the 
Hornet and Super Hornet. Table 5 summarizes the data and lists skill-based 
errors as the number one category. Figure 21 identifies preconditions as being 
the level where most errors occur. Figure 22 illustrates that skill-based errors and 
coordination/communication/planning factors are the top two categories in both 
the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 communities. At the nanocode level (shown 
in Figure 23), three skill-based errors (procedural error, over/undercontrol, and 
breakdown in scan) are common to both services’ F/A-18 top five list, while 
cross-monitoring performance, a Marine Corps top five category, does not 
appear on the Navy’s top 20 list.  
Table 5.   Navy F/A-18 DoD-HFACS Summary Table 
Mishaps 47 Top 5 DoD-HFACS Categories 
Flight Hours 1,823,327 1. SKILL-BASED ERRORS  
Mishap Rate 2.58 2. 
COORDINATION/ 
COMMUNICATION/ 
PLANNING FACTORS  
Nanocodes 227 3. AWARENESS (COGNITIVE) FACTORS 
Nanocode Rate 12.45 4. JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING ERRORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 
top 5 categories 
61.2% 5. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 











Figure 22.   Navy F/A-18 DoD-HFACS Category Rates 
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Figure 23.   Navy F/A-18 Top 20 DoD-HFACS Nanocode Rates 
5. Marine Corps F/A-18 
The Marine Corps F/A-18 dataset contains all single and two-seat variants 
of the Hornet; the Marine Corps does not fly the Super Hornet. Table 6 
summarizes the data with skill-based errors identified as the number one 
category. Figure 24 identifies preconditions as being the level where most errors 
occur. Figure 25 again illustrates that skill-based errors and 
coordination/communication/planning factors are the top two categories in both 
the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 communities. Figure 25 also shows that five 
categories: perception error, physical environment, physical/mental limitations, 
psycho-behavioral factors, and supervisory violations have yet to be cited in any 
Marine Corps F/A-18 mishaps. Although three nanocodes (procedural error, 




Marine Corps F/A-18s, two of the Navy’s top five (decision making and mental 
fatigue) are either at the bottom or do not make the Marine Corps’ top 20 list (see 
Figure 26). 
Table 6.   Marine Corps F/A-18 DoD-HFACS Summary Table 
Mishaps 23 Top 5 DoD-HFACS Categories 
Flight Hours 814,914 1. SKILL-BASED ERRORS  
Mishap Rate 2.82 2. 
COORDINATION/ 
COMMUNICATION/ 
PLANNING FACTORS  
Nanocodes 62 3. ADVERSE PHYSIOLOGICAL STATES  
Nanocode Rate 7.61 4. JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING ERRORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 
top 5 categories 
72.6% 5. PERCEPTUAL FACTORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 




Figure 24.   Marine Corps F/A-18 DoD-HFACS Level Rates 
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Figure 25.   Marine Corps F/A-18 DoD-HFACS Category Rates 
 
Figure 26.   Marine Corps F/A-18 Top 20 DoD-HFACS Nanocode Rates 
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6. Navy Helicopter (H-60) 
The Navy helicopter dataset contains all variants of the H-60 Seahawk. 
Table 7 summarizes the data and lists coordination/communication/planning 
factors as the number one category. Figure 27 identifies preconditions as being 
the level where most errors occur. Figure 28 illustrates that 
coordination/communication/planning factors, skill-based errors, and psycho-
behavioral factors are three categories in the top five of both the Navy and 
Marine Corps helicopter communities. Additionally, the Marine Corps’ fourth most 
frequent category, violations, ranked sixth in the Navy. Three of the top five 
nanocodes in Navy helicopters were common to the Marine Corps: procedural 
error, risk assessment, and cross-monitoring performance (see Figure 29).  
 
Table 7.   Navy Helicopter DoD-HFACS Summary Table 
Mishaps 16 Top 5 DoD-HFACS Categories 
Flight Hours 1,164,774 1. 
COORDINATION/ 
COMMUNICATION 
 PLANNING FACTORS  
Mishap Rate 1.37 2. SKILL-BASED ERRORS  
Nanocodes 134 3. INADEQUATE SUPERVISION 
Nanocode Rate 11.50 4. PSYCHO-BEHAVIORAL FACTORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 
top 5 categories 
68.7% 5. JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING ERRORS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 









Figure 28.   Navy Helicopter DoD-HFACS Category Rates 
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Figure 29.   Navy Helicopter Top 20 DoD-HFACS Nanocode Rates 
7. Marine Corps Helicopter (H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-1W) 
The Marine Corps helicopter dataset contains all variants of four 
helicopters: the H-53, the H-46, the UH-1, and the AH-1W. Table 8 summarizes 
the data and lists coordination/communication/planning factors as the number 
one category. Figure 30 identifies preconditions as being the level where most 
errors occur. Figure 31 reaffirms that that coordination/communication/planning 
factors, skill-based errors, and psycho-behavioral factors are three categories in 
the top five of both the Navy and Marine Corps helicopter communities. 
Additionally, the Navy’s remaining two top five categories, inadequate 
supervision and judgment and decision-making errors, rank sixth and seventh on 
the Marine Corps’ list. Once again, Figure 32 shows that three of the top five 
nanocodes (procedural error, risk assessment, and cross-monitoring  
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performance) are shared by Navy and Marine Corps helicopters. One of Navy’s 
top five nanocodes, supervision inadequate, did not appear of the Marine Corps’ 
top 20 list. 
Table 8.   Marine Corps Helicopter DoD-HFACS Summary Table 
Mishaps 31 Top 5 DoD-HFACS Categories 
Flight Hours 1,483,029 1. 
COORDINATION/ 
COMMUNICATION/ 
PLANNING FACTORS  
Mishap Rate 2.09 2. SKILL-BASED ERRORS  
Nanocodes 279 3. PSYCHO-BEHAVIORAL FACTORS 
Nanocode Rate 18.81 4. VIOLATIONS 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 
top 5 categories 
64.2% 5. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Percentage of nanocodes accounted for in 





Figure 30.    Marine Corps Helicopter DoD-HFACS Level Rates 
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Figure 31.   Marine Corps Helicopter DoD-HFACS Category Rates 
 
Figure 32.   Marine Corps Helicopter Top 20 DoD-HFACS Nanocode Rates 
 67
F. DISCUSSION 
The primary objective of this analytical effort was to identify which DoD-
HFACS categories were most commonly used to classify mishaps within various 
subgroups within Naval Aviation. Table 9 summarizes the five most frequently 
occurring DoD-HFACS categories. The top two categories across all 
communities were skill-based errors and coordination/communication/planning 
factors. In general, these two categories occurred at a much higher rate than 
other categories, doubling the occurrence rate of the third place category in many 
cases. Judgment and decision-making errors appeared in the top five list of all 
but Marine Corps helicopters, where it placed seventh. From this analysis it is 
clear that safety efforts should focus on these areas. 
Table 9.   Summary Table of Top Five DoD-HFACS Categories 


































































































Moving up the DoD-HFACS hierarchy to examine the frequency of levels 
identified in mishaps, the order was the same in every case: preconditions, acts, 
supervision, and organizational influences. At first, this might seem surprising 
given that three of the top five nanocodes in each community belong to the acts 
level. The reason that the preconditions level was the most frequently occurring 
level is likely due to the additive effect of being comprised of 92 nanocodes. In 
contrast, the acts levels contains just 16 nanocodes. In any case, the levels of 
DoD-HFACS contain several types of human error that lend themselves to 
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different intervention strategies. Therefore, the relative frequency of the levels of 
DoD-HFACS provides little insight into the causes and remedies of mishaps. 
Turning to the nanocode level, the most common nanocodes were 
procedural error, over/undercontrol, and breakdown in scan, which are skill-
based errors. The most common coordination/communication/planning factors 
nanocodes were cross-monitoring performance and leadership. Other frequently 
used nanocodes in the coordination/communication/planning factors category 
include: mission planning, mission briefing, communication, and challenge and 
reply. Although these nanocodes occurred at different frequencies within specific 
communities, they describe specific errors that generalize to the aviation 
community as a whole. 
Although intervention strategy generation will be discussed in more depth 
in Chapter V, the results of this analytic effort appear to support the reasoning 
behind traditional safety programs. Procedural and proficiency training have long 
been a hallmark of Naval Aviation. These efforts clearly are aimed at reducing 
the frequency of skill-based errors. Another prominent safety program within 
Naval Aviation is Crew Resource Management (CRM). CRM is specifically 
designed to improve the coordination and communication between aircrew and 
reduce the error types within the coordination/communication/planning factors 
category. To examine the relevance of these results to mishaps outside Naval 
Aviation, these findings will be compared to other aviation studies that have used 
HFACS to classify mishap causal factors. 
1. Comparison with Other HFACS Studies 
Comparing these results to previous studies of military aviation mishaps 
revealed many similarities. Gibb and Olson (2008) examined 124 U.S. Air Force 
class A mishaps between October 1992 and March 2005 that were classified into 
one of four types: controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), loss of control (LoC), spatial 
disorientation (SD), or midair collision (Midair). The CFIT category was further 
subdivided into mishaps that occurred during the enroute portion of flight (CFIT-
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1) and in the approach and landing phase of flight (CFIT-2/ALA). In this study 
mishap reports were recoded from the original format into HFACS and 
frequencies at each level were determined by mishap type. Table 10 summarizes 
their findings. The top five DoD-HFACS categories of all Navy and Marine Corps 
mishaps from the current analytical effort are also found on Gibb and Olson’s list 
of most frequent mishap categories. This suggests that human error types in the 
U.S. Air Force are similar to those found in the Navy and Marine Corps. 
 
Table 10.   Summary of Most Frequent HFACS Categories Contributing to a  
Mishap Sequence (From: Gibb & Olson, 2008, p. 318) 
 
Three other studies have examined aviation mishaps using the HFACS 
taxonomy. Li and Harris (2006) examined 523 mishaps that occurred in the 
Republic of China (R.O.C.) Air Force from 1978 to 2002. Investigation reports 
were then recoded into the Wiegmann and Shappell HFACS taxonomy. 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2001) examined U.S. commercial aviation mishaps 
using HFACS. In that study, 119 mishaps between 1990 and 1996 were also 
coded from mishap reports using the HFACS taxonomy. Shappell et al. 
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conducted a follow on study in 2007 of commercial aviation that included a total 
of 1,020 accidents from 1990 to 2002. Once again, HFACS was used to recode 
investigation reports for analysis.  
Table 11 summarizes the findings from these three studies and compares 
them to the current analytical effort. Skill-based errors and judgment decision-
making errors (called decision errors in the HFACS taxonomy) appeared in the 
top five categories of all four studies. It is not surprising that these two human 
error types are consistent across military, civil, and foreign military aviation 
communities. All mishaps were the direct result of some action. In the HFACS 
taxonomy, skill-based and decision-making errors comprise the majority of 
possible actions that can directly cause a mishap. A more compelling issue for 
safety professionals to examine is the circumstances that encourage the 
occurrence of these errors.  
Table 11.   Comparison of Current Analytical Effort to Three Studies of Aviation 
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2 Skill-Based Errors Decision Errors Crew Resource Management 
Skill-Based 
Errors 
3 Psycho-Behavioral Factors 
Adverse Mental 
States Decision Errors Decision Errors 
4 Judgment & Decision-Making Errors 
Resource 
Management Violations Violations 







 In the DoD-HFACS taxonomy Awareness (Cognitive) Factors and Psycho-Behavioral 
Factors are both combined in Adverse Mental States in the version of HFACS used in the studies 
by Wiegmann and Shappell (2001), Shappell et al. (2007), and Li and Harris (2005). 
 Coordination/Communication/Planning Factors in DoD-HFACS is equivalent to Crew 
Resource Management in HFACS. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
The results of this analytical effort indicate that coordination/ 
communication/planning factors and skill-based errors were the most common 
errors in the Naval Safety Center mishap database. Furthermore, these findings 
are similar to those from other aviation communities. Although this effort has 
examined mishap data exclusively, it is only one side of the story of human error. 
The next chapter will examine the opinions of operational aircrews about the 
most likely types of human error. Using the identified mishap causes of the past 
and the perceived potential causes of future will possibly yield a more complete 
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IV. EXAMINATION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR FORCES 
STRATEGIC HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
Although mishap investigations provide an important feedback mechanism 
to safety professionals, it is not the only one. Mishap investigations start from 
“ground zero” in an accident and move up the chain of events to determine 
contributors to the mishap. The Naval Safety Program instruction OPNAV 
3750.6R advises mishap investigators to use their best judgment in determining 
the most likely causes of a mishap. Investigators are invited to ask the question, 
“Absent this causal factor would there have been a mishap?” (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2007, p. 6–28) Inevitably, the burden of proof for mishap 
investigators leads to the exclusion of more vague factors that contributed to a 
mishap, but may not have left an evidence trail in an investigation. 
A source of insight that may be able to get at more vague mishap 
contributors is the opinions of aircrew. Those who conduct air operations every 
day have a unique perspective to contribute. In an inherently risky enterprise 
such as aviation, aircrews are likely to have issues that they consider to be 
threats to their safety. These perceived threats are another vital source of 
information for building a robust safety program.  
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this analytical effort is to examine the results of the 
Commander, Naval Air Forces’ strategic human factors review from the spring of 
2008. These results are the considered opinions of current fleet aircrews about 
the nature of risks they face during flight operations. In addition to identifying their 
top human factor concerns, this effort will compare the results to the mishap data 
results described in the previous chapter. The goal is to determine if aircrews 
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identify the same human factors that have been cited in mishaps, or if they 
provide insight into factors that may not be captured in a mishap investigation. 
C. DATA COLLECTION 
Following a string of ten class A mishaps in the first half of FY2008, 
Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) conducted a strategic human factors 
review aimed at reversing this trend. This review directed all squadrons to 
examine several aspects of their safety program. One facet of the review asked 
each individual squadron to identify their top five human factors concerns using 
the nanocodes of the DoD-HFACS classification system. Squadrons were 
instructed that they could analyze current issues or try to predict the cause of the 
next mishap. Results from each squadron were compiled at the appropriate type 
wing that oversees several squadrons of similar aircraft platforms and relayed to 
CNAF. 
Unfortunately, the strategic human factors review was not conducted 
according to strict research protocols. The actual details of how each squadron 
determined its top five human factors causes are unknown. No specific guidance 
was given by CNAF as to the method of collection. Whether the top five concerns 
were chosen via a survey of the entire squadron’s aircrew or simply reflect the 
views of the squadron safety officer or commanding officer is unknown. Likewise, 
there is no information on the familiarity of DoD-HFACS to those squadrons who 
responded. Although the HFACS taxonomy has existed for several years, it has 
only recently been implemented in the Navy. It would be unreasonable to expect 
more than a passing familiarity with DoD-HFACS for the vast majority of Naval 
aircrews. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS METHOD 
The availability of data and the collection method of the CNAF strategic 
human factors review limit the type of analysis that could be done. First, only 
Navy squadrons were tasked to generate a top five human factors list. This 
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means CNAF data can be compared to Naval Safety Center DoD-HFACS 
mishap data for Navy F/A-18s and H-60s only. Second, the only data available 
from CNAF is a summary of the top five concerns of each type wing. The 
complete dataset of each squadron is no longer available. This limits analysis to 
the nanocode level, as nanocodes cannot be accurately compiled into categories 
without the complete dataset.  
The summary by type wing presents an additional challenge. There are 
two Navy type wings that operate F/A-18s and four that operate H-60s. Top five 
lists from individual squadrons were consolidated by type wing at CNAF. The 
result of this collection method is that there are two separate F/A-18 top five 
human factors lists, one for the type wing of East coast-based squadrons and 
one for the type wing of West coast-based squadrons.  
For H-60s, the information is even more convoluted. There are two type 
wings on each coast, resulting in four different top five human factor lists. Further 
complicating matters is the fact that one of the four helicopter wings contains two 
squadrons that fly the H-53 Sea Dragon in addition to the 11 squadrons that fly 
the H-60. Since the full dataset by squadron is unavailable, both helicopter types 
are combined and cannot be separated. The lack of a complete dataset of 
responses also prohibits combining the four type wings into a single list. 
Therefore, all type wing lists will be presented individually. 
Statistical comparison between CNAF human factors review data and 
mishap is also problematic. The CNAF human factors data represents the 
number of times each nanocode was chosen as one of a squadron’s top five 
concerns. DoD-HFACS mishap data has thus far been presented as the rate at 
which nanocodes occurred per 100,000 flight hours. In order to present some 
common framework between the two datasets, percentages and rank order were 
used. For mishap data, rank order simply listed the top five most frequently 
occurring nanocodes. For CNAF data, rank order was based on the number of 
responding squadrons that listed a given nanocode as one of their top five 
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concerns (i.e., the nanocode that was listed by the most squadrons as a top five 
concern would be ranked number one and so on). 
For percentages, individual DoD-HFACS nanocode counts were analyzed 
as a percentage of the total number of mishaps cited in Naval Safety Center 
mishap data involving that aircraft. For example, the Naval Safety Center records 
47 class A mishaps involving F/A-18s between FY2000 and FY2008. The 
number one occurring nanocode in those 47 mishaps is over/undercontrol, which 
was cited in 14 mishaps, or 29.8%. It is important to note that since many 
nanocodes can be cited in a single mishap, these percentages do not sum to 
100%.  
For CNAF human factors review data, the percentage of responding 
squadrons who listed a specific nanocode as being a top five concern were 
presented as a measure of common perception of risk within that type wing. For 
example, 12 out of 13 responding squadrons (92.3%) in the East coast F/A-18 
type wing (CSFWL) chose ops tempo/workload among their top five human 
factors concerns. This percentage indicates that ops/tempo workload appears to 
be a commonly perceived risk among those squadrons. As with the mishap data 
percentages, because each squadron chose five nanocodes, the percentages do 
not sum to 100%. It is important to realize that the percentage figures for both 
mishap and CNAF data are not equivalent. Percentages are only presented to 
convey a sense of the distribution of each dataset.  
E. RESULTS OF CNAF STRATEGIC HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW 
The results of this analytical effort focused on two Navy aircraft platforms: 
the F/A-18 strike fighter and the H-60 helicopter. For each aircraft, a table was 
developed comparing the results from the analysis of Naval Safety Center 
mishap data and CNAF human factors strategic review data for two type wings. 
The first column lists the top five nanocodes cited in mishaps for the relevant 
aircraft platform as determined in the first analytical effort of this thesis. The 
second column is the percentage of class A mishaps in which the corresponding 
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nanocode was cited as a casual factor. The third column lists the five nanocodes 
identified by the squadrons in the relevant type wing as being a top five human 
factors concern during the CNAF strategic human factors review. The fourth 
column lists the percentage of responding squadrons that identified the 
corresponding nanocode in their top five list of concerns. The fifth column shows 
where the CNAF nanocode appeared in the Naval Safety Center ranking of 
nanocodes and the percentage of mishaps in which it was identified as a casual 
factor. Columns six through eight present the same data as column three through 
five for the second type wing. 
1. Navy F/A-18 
Navy F/A-18 squadrons are divided between two type wings: Commander, 
Strike Fighter Wing Atlantic (CSFWL), which oversees all East coast-based 
squadrons and Commander, Strike Fighter Wing Pacific (CSFWP), which 
oversees all West coast-based squadrons. Table 12 summarizes the top five 
nanocodes and rankings for all Naval Safety Center mishap data as well as the 
CNAF strategic human factors review data from both F/A-18 type wings.  
From the first analytical effort, the top four mishap nanocodes for all Navy 
F/A-18s are at the acts level, with the top three being skill-based errors. Only one 
nanocode from any other level, mental fatigue from the preconditions level, was 
listed. CNAF human factors data from both type wings overwhelmingly identified 
ops tempo/workload at the organizational level as the most likely cause of future 
mishaps. In contrast, the ops tempo/workload nanocode was only cited in 4.3% 
of F/A-18 mishap investigations. One act nanocode, procedural error, was 
ranked second for both the mishap and the West coast type wing datasets. 
Complacency and motivation exhaustion (burnout) were identified as a top five 
concern of type wings on both coasts. Although complacency was cited in 8.5% 
of F/A-18 mishap investigations, motivation exhaustion (burnout) has yet to be 
cited once. That is also the case with proficiency, a supervisory level nanocode 
identified by the East coast F/A-18 type wing. 
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Table 12.   Navy F/A-18 Naval Safety Center Mishap and CNAF Strategic 
Human Factors Review DoD-HFACS Nanocode Ranking and 
Comparison 
Safety Center 
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Procedural Error 27.7%* Proficiency 46.2% 
64* / 
0.0% Procedural Error 42.1%* 
 2* / 
27.7% 
Breakdown in Scan 27.7%* Cognitive Task Oversaturation 38.5%* 
 7* / 
14.9% Complacency 42.1%* 
18* / 
8.5% 




















* indicates a tie ranking with other nanocodes 
 
2. Navy H-60 
Navy H-60 squadrons are divided amongst four type wings based on 
geographic location and mission. Commander, Helicopter Maritime Strike Wing 
Atlantic (CHSMWL) and Commander, Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Atlantic 
(CHSCWL) oversee all H-60 squadrons on the East coast. Additionally, 
CHSCWL also oversees two H-53 squadrons.  As previously mentioned, the H-
53 CNAF data is intermixed among the H-60 data and cannot be separated. For 
the West coast, Commander, Helicopter Maritime Strike Wing Pacific (CHSMWP) 
and Commander, Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Pacific (CHSCWP) oversee all H-
60 squadrons exclusively. Tables 13 and 14 each contain the top five most 
frequent nanocodes for the Naval Safety Center H-60 mishap data. Table 13 
compares that mishap data to East and West coast maritime strike helicopter 
squadrons, while Table 14 compares the same mishap data to East and West 
coast sea combat helicopter squadrons. 
A review of the top five mishap nanocodes from the first analytical effort 
reveals three acts: procedural error, over/undercontrol, and risk assessment, one 
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precondition: cross-monitoring performance, and one supervisory nanocode: 
inadequate supervision in the top five mishap nanocodes. In contrast, only one 
acts level nanocode (task misprioritization) was identified by only one of the four 
CNAF type wing top five list of human factors concerns. Eleven preconditions, 
seven supervisory, and six organizational nanocodes dominated the top 
concerns of H-60 squadrons. Ops tempo/workload, a top concern with F/A-18s 
squadrons was also the top concern of three of four helicopter type wings 
(although it has yet to be cited in any helicopter mishap). Proficiency, a 
supervisory nanocode appeared on all four type wings’ top five lists which also 
has not been cited in a single helicopter mishap. Motivational exhaustion 
(burnout) and complacency are two precondition nanocodes that appeared on 
the top five lists of three of the four type wings as well. Complacency was cited in 
25% of helicopter mishaps, yet motivational exhaustion (burnout) has not been 
cited at all. 
 
Table 13.   Navy H-60 Naval Safety Center Mishap and Maritime Strike 
Helicopter CNAF Strategic Human Factors Review DoD-HFACS 
Nanocode Ranking and Comparison 
Safety Center 
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Procedural Error 68.8% Ops Tempo/Workload 66.7%* 
53* / 
0.0% Proficiency 66.7% 
53* / 
0.0% 
Over/Undercontrol 56.3% Complacency 66.7%* 
8* / 
25.0% Complacency 44.4%* 
8* / 
25.0%
Risk Assessment 37.5%* Overconfidence 50.0%* 
21* / 

























Table 14.   Navy H-60 Naval Safety Center Mishap and Sea Combat 
Helicopter CNAF Strategic Human Factors Review DoD-HFACS 
Nanocode Ranking and Comparison 
Safety Center 









































Over/Undercontrol 56.3% Proficiency   53.8%* 
53* / 
0.0% Proficiency 8 
53* / 
0.0% 
Risk Assessment 37.5%* Complacency  38.5% 
8* / 
















































* indicates a tie ranking with other nanocodes 
† The total number of reporting squadrons in this type wing was unavailable. Therefore, instead 
of percentages, the number of squadrons who listed a particular nanocode in their top five human 
factors concerns is presented. 
 
F. DISCUSSION OF CNAF STRATEGIC HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW 
The first goal of this analytical effort was to examine the results of the 
CNAF strategic human factors review conducted in the spring of 2008 to 
determine the nanocodes identified by Navy F/A-18 and H-60 squadrons as most 
likely to be casual factors in future mishaps. It can be seen in Table 15 that ops 
tempo/workload, proficiency, complacency, and motivational exhaustion 
(burnout) appeared in the top five list of concerns of five of the six type wings for 
both F/A-18 and H-60 squadrons. Although there are some differences of rank 
order within the top five for each type wing, there is a large degree of 
commonality across aircraft platforms. In fact, ops tempo/workload was the 
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number one nanocode in five of the six type wings examined. It is important to 
note that the CNAF strategic human factors review depicts a single snapshot 
taken during a time when the United States was currently engaged in two large 
military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It should probably not be surprising then 
that factors such as ops tempo/workload, complacency, and motivation 
exhaustion (burnout) are common concerns for operational aircrews. 
Table 15.   Most Popular DoD-HFACS Nanocodes in Type Wings’ Top Five 
Lists and Comparison to Navy Safety Center Mishap Data 
DoD-HFACS Nanocode 
Number (%) of F/A-18 and 
H-60 Type Wings That 
Listed Nanocode as a Top 
Five Concern 
% of F/A-18 Mishaps 
That Cited Nanocode 
% of H-60 Mishaps 
That Cited Nanocode 
Ops Tempo/Workload 5 (83.3%)* 4.3% 0.0% 
Proficiency 5 (83.3%)* 0.0% 0.0% 
Complacency 5 (83.3%)* 8.5% 25.0% 
Motivational Exhaustion (Burnout) 5 (83.3%)* 0.0% 0.0% 
Cognitive Task Oversaturation 3 (50.0%) 14.9% 0.0% 
* indicates a tie with other nanocodes 
 
G. RESULTS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN NAVAL SAFETY CENTER 
MISHAP DATA AND CNAF STRATEGIC HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW 
The second goal of this analytical effort is to compare the results from the 
CNAF strategic human factors review to the results from the Naval Safety Center 
mishap data presented in Chapter III. Table 15 illustrates that the concerns 
identified in the CNAF strategic human factors review were not the same as the 
leading mishap causes cited in the Naval Safety Center’s database. The 
heightened level of operations previously mentioned might account for the fact 
that current human factors concerns today differ from historical causes of 
mishaps over the last nine years. However, the United States has been engaged 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003, representing over half of the time period 
in question. Therefore, it should reasonably be expected to see at least one 
instance of ops tempo/workload or motivational exhaustion (burnout) cited in a 
mishap between FY2000 and FY2008. 
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Table 16 offers another comparison between the mishap and CNAF data. 
It shows the level (acts, preconditions, supervisory, or organization) of the top 
five nanocodes listed in Tables 12, 13, and 14. Table 16 clearly illustrates that in 
the mishap data, the majority of the nanocodes are from the acts level. However, 
act level nanocodes only appear in two of the type wings’ top five lists. 
Nanocodes at the precondition and supervisory levels comprise the majority of 
human factor concerns among F/A-18 and H-60 squadrons. This indicates a 
distinct difference in the type of nanocodes perceived as a threat to safety by 
operational aircrews and the nanocodes actually cited in mishap investigations. 
More specifically, when asked, aircrews seem to be more likely to look higher up 
the sequence chain of events than mishap investigators. 
Table 16.   Comparison of the DoD-HFACS Levels of Top Five Nanocodes in 
Naval Safety Center Mishap Data and CNAF Strategic Human 
Factors Data 











































Act Act Organization Organization Organization Supervisory Organization Organization
Act Act Supervisory Act Precondition Precondition Supervisory Supervisory
Act Act Precondition Precondition Precondition Precondition Precondition Organization
Act Precondition Precondition Act Precondition Precondition Precondition Organization
Precondition Supervisory Precondition Precondition Supervisory Supervisory Precondition* Act* 
      Supervisory* Precondition*
      Supervisory* Precondition*
       Organization*
* indicates a tie ranking with other nanocodes 
 
H. DISCUSSION OF COMPARISON BETWEEN NAVAL SAFETY CENTER 
MISHAP DATA AND CNAF STRATEGIC HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW 
The comparison between the Naval Safety Center mishap data and the 
CNAF strategic human factors review revealed a difference in the DoD-HFACS 
level in which the leading nanocodes were selected. Mishap investigators tended 
to identify acts as the leading causes of mishaps, while squadrons responded 
that preconditions, supervisory, and organizational level nanocodes were the 
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most likely causes of future mishaps. This disparity may represent a shift in the 
causes of mishaps, but more likely is the result of biases inherent in the sources 
of data.  
One possible reason for the bias of investigators towards nanocodes at 
the acts level is inherent in the investigation process. A mishap investigation 
generally starts at the crash site and works backwards in time to establish the 
sequence of events that caused the accident. Therefore, act level nanocodes are 
the first human factors encountered by investigators. Additionally, act level 
nanocodes are often the easiest nanocodes of which to find conclusive evidence. 
For example, it easy to assign a nanocode of checklist error to a mishap resulting 
from an attempted landing with the landing gear retracted. A decision to continue 
a landing approach during a severe thunderstorm can likewise be easily 
assigned a nanocode of decision-making. Moving further up the hierarchy of 
DoD-HFACS, a thorough investigation may uncover evidence of nanocodes at 
the precondition level such as inadequate rest by interviewing the pilot’s spouse 
or roommates about his or her recent sleep habits.  
As investigators move further up the levels of DoD-HFACS however, 
many nanocodes become vague and difficult to conclusively determine from the 
evidence. Ops tempo/workload, an organizational level nanocode identified as 
the top concern of five type wings, may be extremely difficult to authoritatively 
cite in a mishap investigation. Consider a deployed squadron that is operating at 
an intense pace with most pilots flying two or more times a day for weeks on end. 
On one such flight, the pilot makes a grave judgment error that results in a 
mishap. After investigators identify nanocodes at the acts, preconditions, and 
supervisory levels, they might consider that the recent ops tempo of the 
squadron influenced the stress levels and amount of rest available to the mishap 
pilot. However, how do investigators demonstrably prove ops tempo was a 
factor? Every other pilot in the squadron was operating under similar stress at the 
same operational tempo, yet they had not had a mishap. Investigators may be 
reluctant to assign an ops tempo/workload nanocode even in a highly stressful 
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operational environment based on the relative success of the mishap pilot’s 
peers at avoiding a mishap. Therefore, these broad and often vague nanocodes, 
particularly at the supervisory and organizational level may be absent from 
mishap investigation data because of the difficulty in finding conclusive proof.  
A number of authors have identified biases that may have been present in 
the mishap investigations and CNAF strategic human factors review (Woodcock, 
1995; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998). The tendency to place blame on individuals 
rather than circumstances is called fundamental attribution error and is believed 
by many researchers to be an inherent bias in many accident investigations 
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998). This attribution error may be one reason mishap 
nanocodes are more prevalent in the act and preconditions levels, which are 
most closely associated with individuals, vice surrounding circumstances. The 
supervisory and organizational levels of DoD-HFACS attempt to capture the 
influence of the larger situational context on the occurrence of the mishap. 
Fundamental attribution error may be inhibiting these factors from being captured 
in the Naval Safety Center’s mishap database. 
In contrast, respondents in the CNAF strategic human factor review were 
not constrained by normal mishap investigation procedures. It is unlikely that 
respondents began with the acts of a hypothetical mishap and worked backwards 
as mishap investigators would. These respondents were free to choose the 
nanocodes they believed most likely to cause future accidents without constraint. 
Respondents also were not burdened with providing evidence to support their 
assertions of likely contributors to future mishaps. Their choices for the top 
human factors concerns were undoubtedly driven by their experiences of 
mitigating risks during flight operations on a daily basis. As a result, squadrons’ 
choices of nanocodes represented a more diverse distribution across all levels of 
DoD-HFACS. It is likely some real concerns that were not captured in the Naval 
Safety Center mishap data were brought to light in the CNAF strategic human 
factors review. However, the choices made by squadrons are not immune from 
inherent biases of their own. 
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Defensive attribution bias is the tendency of individuals to identify with 
accident victims and therefore attribute mishap causes to situational factors 
rather than personal factors (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998). Defensive attribution 
bias may be the reason few act-level nanocodes found their way into the top five 
concerns in the CNAF dataset. Few pilots would willingly admit their lack of skill 
or flawed judgment would most likely cause the next mishap. It is far more likely 
they would identify external factors that could impair their otherwise error-free 
performance. This bias may explain the prevalence of nanocodes at the 
preconditions, supervisory, and organizational level in the CNAF results. 
The discussion of fundamental attribution error and defensive attribution 
bias is not intended to cynically criticize the sources of either the mishap or the 
CNAF datasets. The contributors to both were assuredly honest, well-meaning 
individuals who reached their conclusions after careful consideration. That being 
said, the discussion of the possible presence of biases is meant to offer an 
explanation for the differing results from each dataset. Ground truth of the actual 
proportion of responsibility between individuals and the surrounding 
circumstances can never be known. However, viewing aircraft mishaps from 
differing perspectives is likely to lead to safety that is more effective. 
I. CONCLUSION 
The results of the CNAF strategic human factors review indicated that F/A-
18 and H-60 squadrons perceive ops tempo/workload, proficiency, complacency, 
and motivational exhaustion (burnout) as the most likely causes of future 
mishaps. These human factors differed sharply from the leading causes of 
mishaps cited in the Naval Safety Center database: skill-based errors and 
coordination/communication/planning factors. Although the situational factors 
identified by aircrews and the personnel factors identified by mishap investigators 
may have been influenced by inherent biases based upon their perspectives, 
taken together, they represent a more complete picture of all the contributors to a 
mishap. If mishap interventions are to be successful, they must take all of these 
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factors into account. This is particularly true when considering the design of next 
generation aircraft. The next chapter will explore using a human systems 
integration approach to generate mishap interventions for future aircraft system 
designs.  
 87
V. MISHAP INTERVENTION DEVELOPMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
As illustrated in the two previous chapters, trying to get at the causes of 
mishaps can be difficult enough. However, the purpose of the investigation is to 
prevent similar mishaps from occurring in the future. While it may seem that once 
the causes are known, the solutions are self-evident, rarely is this actually the 
case. This is particularly true with skill-based and judgment and decision-making 
errors made at the act level. At first glance, it may seem that mandating more 
practice and training might help keep a pilot from forgetting an item on a 
checklist, but perhaps the problem doesn’t lie with the familiarity of the checklist 
at all. Perhaps the true issue lies in changing the preconditions that allowed that 
pilot to become distracted or prone to being forgetful. The advantage of the 
HFACS taxonomy is the ability to identify higher-level influences and intervene 
appropriately. 
Although historical mishap investigations and aircrew surveys can provide 
useful data to safety professionals for the prevention of mishaps in current 
systems, they can also aid in the design and incorporation of mishap prevention 
measures into future systems as well. The range of possible interventions 
available in current aircraft is often limited. While many possible interventions are 
relatively inexpensive (new procedures, additional training), others are not 
(redesign of navigation or flight management systems). However, in the design 
phase of future aircraft, many more options are available to guard against future 
mishaps. This is why it is critical for acquisition program managers and HSI 
practitioners working on future aircraft to consider safety from the very beginning. 
Lessons learned from current generation aircraft mishaps can provide valuable 
insight into the likely sources of human error in future systems. Decisions made 
early in the design process can lead to an aircraft that supports human decision 
making and prevents common errors, or saddles future pilots with an ineffectual 
system fraught with opportunities for error.  
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B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this analytical effort is the development of a pilot 
methodology for mishap intervention generation and evaluation. A recently 
developed system called the Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) will be 
presented and used as the basis of a human systems integration (HSI) approach 
to mishap prevention. HFIX will be evaluated for completeness and modified as 
necessary in order to produce a complete methodology for use by safety 
professionals in influencing the design of future aircraft systems. 
C. HUMAN FACTORS INTERVENTION MATRIX (HFIX) 
Shappell and Wiegmann (2006, 2009, in press), the creators of the 
HFACS taxonomy, recognized that categorizing the human factors causes of 
mishaps was only a partial solution to mishap prevention. There was also a need 
to develop a system that would aid investigators in identifying methods for 
preventing similar mishaps from occurring in the future. With this in mind, they 
created a methodology for mishap intervention development called the Human 
Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX). The purpose of HFIX is to aid decision 
makers in considering several possible categories for mishap interventions 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). Additionally, HFIX provides a method to evaluate 
possible intervention strategies and make comparisons between them. Although 
HFIX is a relatively new and untested methodology that has only been used in a 
few studies of general and commercial aviation by its authors (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2009, in press), its shows promise as a companion to the HFACS 
taxonomy. The basic HFIX process as described by Shappell and Wiegmann 
(2006, 2009, in press) will be delineated. Next, modifications to HFIX will be 
proposed that incorporate the lessons learned from the first two analytical efforts, 
the domains of HSI, and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System.  
The HFIX methodology is designed to develop intervention strategies 
targeted at preventing or mitigate errors within the four act-level categories of 
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HFACS: decision errors, skill-based errors, perceptual errors, and violations 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006). In order to accomplish this, five broad areas of 
intervention, or domains, are proposed by Shappell and Wiegmann (2006, 2009, 
in press): organizational/administrative, human/crew, technology/engineering, 
task/mission, and operational/physical environment (Table 17 defines each of the 
domains). The HFIX matrix, shown in Figure 33, helps guide safety professionals 
in the development of interventions for each category of human error through a 
series of brainstorming sessions.  
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Table 17.   Domains of Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) (From: 
Shappell & Wiegmann, in press) 
Administrative 
Human Resource Management: Adequacy of staff in specific situations, the 
need for additional personnel, and the evaluation of individual skills of 
employees. 
Rules/Regulations/Policies: Issuing, modifying, establishing, amending, and/or 
reviewing policies, rules, or regulations. 
Information Management/Communication:  
Improvements in disseminating, storing, archiving and publishing information. 
Also included are recommendations regarding collection of data, issuing 
information, and reporting activity.  
Research/Special Study: Conducting research to determine the impact of 
recent technological advances or call for special studies to review processes, 
develop/validate methodologies, etc. 
Task 
Procedures: Amending, reviewing, modifying, revising, establishing, 
developing, and validating procedures.  
Manuals: Reviewing, revising, issuing, and modifying manuals, bulletins, 
checklists, and other instructions or guidance. 
Technological 
Design/Repair: Specific manufacturing changes including the design of parts. 
Also included is the modification, replacement, removal and/or installation or 
repair of parts and equipment. 
Inspection: Maintenance inspections, overhauling, detecting damage including 
day-to-day operations such as inspecting fuel, oil level, and recommended 
safety checks. 
Operational Environment 
Operational/Physical Environment: Modifications to the operational 
environment (e.g., weather, altitude, terrain) or the ambient environment, 
such as heat, vibration, lighting, eliminating toxins, etc. to improve 
performance. 
Human/Crew 
Training: Reviewing, developing, and implementing training programs. Also 






















Figure 33.   Domains of Human Factors Integration Matrix (From: Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2006) 
The first phase of the HFIX methodology is intervention generation. 
Shappell and Wiegmann (in press) recommend gathering a group of 20 
individuals with a variety of experiences and backgrounds for this task. For 
aviation mishap intervention generation, participants should include aircrew, 
maintainers, logisticians, administrators, and air traffic controllers. Ideally, all 
participants should be instructed to dress casually and no formal introductions 
should be made. The purpose of these steps is to help conceal each individual’s 
place within the organization in order to avoid any real or perceived rank or 
authority gradients.  
The 20 participants are then randomly assigned to one of five working 
groups. Each working group is assigned an intervention domain (e.g., 
technology/ engineering) and a particular mishap cause. The group is then given 
15 minutes to generate as many interventions within that domain as possible. At 
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this point, no idea is considered too far-fetched and no effort is made to evaluate 
interventions. After 15 minutes, the group is prompted with a sheet of questions 
in order to further stimulate the generation of new interventions. Two examples of 
these questions from the technology/engineering domain are: “How could 
controls be more easily identified, and/or better designed in terms of shape, size, 
and other relevant considerations?” and “How could information sources be 
integrated or located in an effective manner?” (Shappell & Wiegmann, in press). 
After another 15 minutes of intervention generation, each workgroup adopts a 
new intervention domain (e.g., task/mission) and repeats the process.  
Once a list of suggested interventions has been created for each domain, 
the evaluation process begins. In this process, a smaller group of experts then 
rates each proposed intervention on a scale of one to five for each of the five 
criteria known as “FACES”: feasibility, acceptability, cost, effectiveness, and 
sustainability. Using a rating of “one” for poor and “five” for excellent, the 
participants rate each intervention on every evaluation criterion. All individual 
ratings for each criterion are then averaged together to arrive at a group average 
rating for feasibility, a group average rating for acceptability, and so on.  
Explanations and examples of the FACES criteria are given below. 
1. Feasibility  
Feasibility refers to the ease with which an intervention could be 
implemented. For example, one possible intervention to reduce the number of 
mishaps that occur at night due to a lack of proficiency might be to eliminate 
night flight operations altogether. Clearly this is not a very feasible option for the 
U.S. military. However, increasing the number of night flight hours each pilot 
must log every month is a much more feasible intervention. 
2. Acceptability  
Acceptability is the extent to which personnel affected by the intervention 
will be agreeable to it. To illustrate, mandating the use of autopilot landing 
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systems 100% of the time might reduce pilot skill-based error mishaps in the 
landing phase, but few pilots will find that an acceptable solution. 
3. Cost 
Cost refers to the financial burden of implementing the intervention. This 
cost could be direct (dollar amount) or indirect (an increased number of 
personnel required, which will in turn raises monetary costs). 
4. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is the ability of the intervention to eliminate or reduce the 
likelihood of a mishap. Effectiveness is a given requirement of any intervention 
strategy, but rating its likelihood in preventing future mishaps allows comparison 
among multiple intervention strategies. 
5. Sustainability 
Sustainability is both the ability of the intervention to maintain its 
effectiveness over the long term and the organization’s ability to support it. For 
example, briefing all aircrews on the causes of recent trends in mishaps may 
make them more aware of certain risk factors, but this awareness will likely fade 
with time.  
Once every intervention strategy has been rated on the FACES criteria, 
comparisons between each strategy are made. An organization may choose to 
treat each of the FACES criterion as equally important. In that case, the ratings 
for each criterion are averaged together to create a single number rating for each 
intervention. Rank ordering of the interventions by this single rating would reveal 
the interventions most worth pursuing. However, some organizations may wish to 
prioritize some criteria over others. For example, Navy leadership may place less 
emphasis on acceptability if it is felt that pilots can be ordered to accept whatever 
interventions are chosen. Likewise, if the consequences of failure are dire, cost 
may prove less a concern than effectiveness. In order to take these priorities into 
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account, safety professionals can weight each criterion appropriately and 
determine which interventions best suit the needs of their organization (Shappell 
& Wiegmann, in press). 
D. COMPARISON OF HUMAN FACTORS INTERVENTION MATRIX (HFIX) 
DOMAINS 
Although the HFIX domains of organizational/administrative, human/crew, 
technology/engineering, task/mission, and operational/physical environment are 
intended to cover the scope of possible interventions, consideration of other 
domains is warranted. Two possible sources of alternative domains for 
intervention development are those of human systems integration and the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System used in the DoD acquisition 
process. Each series of alternate domains will be discussed briefly and 
compared in order to arrive at the optimum set of possible domains for mishap 
intervention. 
1. Human Systems Integration 
Human systems integration (HSI) is an interdisciplinary approach to 
ensuring the human is thoroughly considered in the design, development, and 
integration of a new system. HSI considers the domains of manpower, personnel, 
training, human factors engineering, survivability, habitability, and safety and 
occupational health. Of all these domains of HSI, manpower, personnel, training, 
and human factors engineering are the primary domains that can be manipulated 
during the system acquisitions process in order to produce desired levels of 
personnel survivability, habitability, safety, and occupational health (Tvaryanas, 
Brown, & Miller, 2009). The HSI approach builds uses the strengths in each 
domain and performs tradeoffs between them in order to optimize total system 
performance. Minimizing human error and increasing safety is a necessary 
byproduct of this process. Therefore, the domains of HSI offer a broader 
alternative to the HFIX domains proposed by Shappell and Wiegmann (2006, 
2009, in press). 
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2. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) 
Another alternative framework for mishap intervention generation is the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS is the 
means by which the DoD assesses military capability needs. A key part of the 
JCIDS process is the DOTMLPF analysis. DOTMLPF is an acronym for doctrine, 
organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities. The Defense 
Safety Oversight Council lists as one of its key tasks the examination of “existing 
systems, missions, processes, applications, policies, and programs through the 
DOTMLPF process to discover the best fit for human-systems capabilities and 
thereby facilitate mishap prevention and safety” (Chair, Defense Safety Oversight 
Council, 2008, p. 1). Therefore, it is appropriate that these domains be 
considered during intervention development. An explanation of each domain 
taken from the DoD’s JCIDS Manual (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009) is 
listed below:  
• Doctrine: the fundamental principles that guide employment of U.S. 
forces. 
• Organization: the structure by which individuals and units interact 
with one another to accomplish the mission. 
• Training: the training and rehearsals of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures used in the execution of the mission. 
• Material: all items (including weapons systems, parts, and supplies) 
necessary to operate and support military forces. 
• Leadership: the training, education, experience, and self-
improvement required to develop the most professionally 
competent individual possible. 
• Personnel: qualified personnel who are able to support the mission. 
• Facilities: buildings, structures, and installations equipped to 
support military operations. 
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The domains of DOTMLPF are those considered when the DoD develops 
or modifies a military capability. Each of these domains represents a possible 
solution for bridging an identified capability gap. These domains also provide 
another set of domains from which mishap intervention strategies could be 
developed. 
3. Comparison of Mishap Intervention Areas with Domains of 
HFIX, HSI, and DOTMLPF 
The main purpose of the domains of HFIX is to provide structured 
guidance to the brainstorming sessions in the intervention generation phase. 
Additionally, the domains provide a checklist of areas of consideration to ensure 
a thorough search for intervention strategies has been conducted. In order to be 
effective, the list of domains should be comprehensive, and address all possible 
intervention strategies. In addition, the individual domains must not be too 
general to ensure that all areas are given adequate attention. A list of possible 
mishap intervention areas was generated incorporating the definitions of the 
domains of HFIX, HSI, and DOTMLPF and is presented in Table 18. This list is 
intended to provide the full range of choices from which mishap intervention 
strategies could be developed. For each one of these mishap intervention areas, 
the appropriate domain (if available) from HFIX, HSI, and DOTMLPF is noted.  
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Table 18.   Crosswalk of Mishap Intervention Areas With Domains of HFIX, 
HSI, and DOTMLPF 
Mishap Intervention Area HFIX Domains HSI Domains DOTMLPF Domains 
Number Of Personnel Organizational/ Administrative Manpower Personnel 
Personnel Skill Sets And 
Qualifications 
Organizational/ 
Administrative Personnel Personnel 
Rules / Policies / Regulations Organizational/ Administrative   
Informational Management / 
Communication 
Organizational/ 
Administrative   
Research/Special Study Organizational/ Administrative   
Procedures / 
Manuals Task/Mission   
Design / Repair Technology/ Engineering 
Human Factors 
Engineering Material 






Training Human/Crew Training Training / Leadership 
Doctrine   Doctrine 
Organizational Structure Organizational/ Administrative  Organization 
Organizational Culture Organizational/ Administrative  Organization 
Supporting Facilities   Facilities 
Table 18 illustrates that no single set of domains addresses every mishap 
intervention area listed. This suggests that no one set is adequate to ensure all 
possible intervention strategies are covered. Additionally, one of the HFIX 
domains, in particular, encompasses a wide range of intervention areas. The 
broad spectrum of the HFIX organizational/administrative domain covers 
everything from the number and skill sets of personnel, to rules and regulations, 
to organizational structure. This broad domain lacks the specificity to ensure no 
possibilities are overlooked. Breaking the organizational/administrative domain 
into a few explicit domains would likely ensure each of the intervention areas are 
adequately scrutinized. 
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E. RECOMMENDED MISHAP INTERVENTION DOMAINS 
After careful consideration of the mishap intervention areas and domains 
presented, Table 19 is offered as an alternative to the lists of domains described 
above. The resulting list of domains incorporates the best attributes of HFIX, HSI, 
and DOTMLPF to represent the full spectrum of intervention options available to 
safety professionals. The eight recommended mishap intervention domains are: 
mission, manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, policy/ 
procedures, leadership, and facilities/environment. Table 19 gives a brief 
description of each domain and two fundamental questions that guide safety 
professionals in developing interventions within that domain. 
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Table 19.   Recommended Mishap Intervention Domains 
Domain Description/Questions 
Mission 
The assigned mission of the aircraft, personnel, or system. 
- Is the mission necessary? 
- Can the mission be modified to reduce the threat of a mishap? 
Manpower 
The number and type of military, DoD civilians, and contractors needed to 
operate, support, and maintain a system. 
- Would increasing or decreasing the number of personnel reduce the 
likelihood of a mishap? 
- Would changing the type of personnel (contractor, DoD civilian, 
military) reduce the likelihood of a mishap? 
Personnel 
The human performance characteristics required of a system’s user 
population to include their knowledge, skills, and abilities.  
- Do personnel recruited have the necessary abilities to operate the 
system? 
-  Could modifying selection criteria reduce the likelihood of a mishap? 
Training 
The means to enhance and maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities of a 
system’s operators, maintainers, and support personnel to ensure optimal 
performance. 
- Is existing training adequate to maintain the skills and abilities of 
personnel? 




The optimization of human-machine interface in the design and engineering 
of a system, accounting for the physical, sensory, and cognitive 
characteristics of the user population. 
- Does the design of the system fit the characteristics of the user 
population? 
- Is there a more effective information or control interface between the 
system and the user? 
Policy/ 
Procedures 
The policies, rules, regulations, procedures, and documentation such as 
manuals that support a system. 
- Are the procedures and documentation for the system’s operation 
and maintenance accurate? 
- Are there sufficient rules and regulations governing safe operation of 
the system? 
Leadership 
The structure, culture, and guidance of an organization in the conduct of its 
mission. 
- Does the culture and structure of an organization support the safe 
operation of the system? 
- Are violations of rules and regulations swiftly corrected or tolerated? 
Facilities/ 
Environment 
The buildings, facilities, operating environment in which the system is 
operated. 
- Are the system’s facilities adequate to support safe operations? 




F. HFACS LEVELS EVALUATED IN HFIX 
The results from the first two analytical efforts demonstrated a diverse 
range of human errors that cause aircraft mishaps. While the examination of 
mishap data revealed act-level nanocodes of errors, the CNAF strategic human 
factors review pointed towards nanocodes at the higher preconditions, 
supervisory, and organization levels. As originally proposed by Shappell and 
Wiegmann (2006, 2009, in press), HFIX only addresses the HFACS categories at 
the acts level. If mishap investigations were used as the sole predictor of future 
causes of mishaps, the first analytical effort of this thesis would support that 
design. However, the CNAF strategic human factors review revealed that 
aircrews’ perceptions of future causes of mishaps belonged to higher levels of 
HFACS that would not be addressed by HFIX. To account for these concerns, 
HFIX needs to be expanded. 
In order to appropriately address the concerns of mishap investigators and 
aircrews, a mishap intervention generation methodology should be just as 
comprehensive in addressing the possible mishap causes as it is in the spectrum 
of domains it uses to generate solutions. Again, using the HFIX methodology as 
a starting point, it is recommended that the categories of HFACS examined be 
expanded to include all 20 categories of DoD-HFACS. Figure 34 incorporates all 
20 DoD-HFACS categories and the eight mishap intervention domains discussed 
above. Using this revised HFIX matrix, safety professionals can address the full 
range of human error with a full spectrum of solutions.  
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Skill-based Errors         
Judgment Decision-making 
Errors 
        
Perception Errors         
Violations         
Cognitive Factors         
Psycho-behavioral Factors         
Adverse Physiological Factors         
Physical/Mental Limitations         
Perceptual Factors         
Physical Environment         
Technological Environment         
Coordinating/Communication/ 
Planning Factors 
        
Self-imposed Stress         
Inadequate Supervision         
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations 
        
Failure to Correct Known 
Problem 
        
Supervisory Violations         
Resource/Acquisition 
Management 
        
Organizational Climate         
Organizational Process         
Figure 34.   Revised HFIX Matrix with All DoD-HFACS Categories and Eight 
Mishap Intervention Domains (After Shappell & Wiegmann, 2006, 2009, 
in press) 
Although the revised HFIX matrix is intended to be a more comprehensive 
methodology, the practical application of this larger matrix may seem daunting. 
However, in order to address the leading concerns of safety professionals, 
interventions need not be generated for the entire matrix. Rather, the revised 
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HFIX matrix is intended to be a menu from which safety concerns can be 
analyzed and intervention solutions generated. For example, the leading 
concerns from the first analytical effort’s examination of Naval Safety Center 
mishap data were communication/coordination/planning factors and skill-based 
errors. Safety professionals interested in addressing these concerns need only 
conduct the revised HFIX process for those two categories. Using the CNAF 
strategic human factors review results from the second analytical effort, it would 
also be wise to conduct the HFIX process on the categories of organizational 
processes, planned inappropriate operations, psycho-behavioral factors, and 
cognitive factors.  
Although picking and choosing from the menu of current DoD-HFACS 
categories of concern may be effective for reducing mishap rates in current 
systems, the design phase of future aircraft systems requires a more 
comprehensive process. In considering the design, manning, equipping, and 
operation of future aircraft systems, completing the revised HFIX matrix is a 
worthwhile investment. Although it might be time consuming to explore 
preventative strategies in each domain for each DoD-HFACS category, it would 
likely be more costly in time and financial resources to address deficiencies in a 
fielded system that could have been prevented with adequate forethought. As 
such, the revised HFIX matrix can provide assurances that the prevention of 
human error was given due consideration early in the acquisition process. 
HFIX, as originally put forth by Shappell and Wiegmann (2006, 2009, in 
press), has not yet been widely scrutinized in safety research. Likewise, the 
revised HFIX framework presented in this thesis will have to be evaluated and 
adapted as required based on further research and application. A longitudinal 
study of human factors contributions to mishaps before and after its application 
would clearly yield the most effective evaluation of its worth. It is hoped that 
acquisitions professionals and HSI practitioners will find value in applying the 
revised HFIX methodology to a systematic safety review of future aircraft 
systems design.  
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G. CONCLUSION 
The ultimate goal of any safety program is the prevention of future 
mishaps. The HFIX methodology is a useful process in the generation and 
evaluation of mishap intervention strategies. The purpose of this analytical effort 
was to expand the breadth and depth of HFIX to include all possible sources of 
intervention strategies and all possible sources of human error categorized by 
DoD-HFACS. The domains of HSI and DOTMLPF were explored and 
incorporated to expand the sources from which safety professionals can draw 
upon for solutions. As revealed by the results of the analysis of the CNAF 
strategic human factors review, sources of human error beyond the acts level 
can be important in the prevention of future mishaps. Addressing these human 
errors is important for an effective safety program. Finally, the design phase of 
future aircraft systems should include a comprehensive exploration of all sources 
of human error within the DoD-HFACS taxonomy and appropriate mishap 
intervention domains applied to produce a safe and operationally effective 
system. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the leading causes of Naval 
Aviation mishaps and develop a methodology for the generation and evaluation 
of mishap intervention strategies. To this end, three analytical efforts were 
conducted. The first effort was an analysis of Naval Aviation mishaps to 
determine the most frequently occurring type of human error. The second effort 
analyzed the results of a survey of Naval aircrews intended to determine the 
human errors perceived to be likely causes of future mishaps. The third effort 
explored and revised a methodology for developing mishap intervention 
strategies in current and future aircraft systems. 
The first analytical effort of this thesis examined Naval Aviation mishap 
data from FY2000-FY2008. These mishap investigation reports were recently 
recoded into the Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (DoD-HFACS) taxonomy by a Naval Safety Center analyst. 
This taxonomy is a standard methodology to classify, catalog, and analyze the 
contribution of human error to mishaps. For the data available, the most 
commonly occurring DoD-HFACS categories were determined for the following 
communities: Navy and Marine Corps combined (F/A-18, AV-8B, H-60, H-53, H-
46, UH-1, & AH-1W), overall Navy (F/A-18 & H-60), overall Marine Corps (F/A-
18, AV-8B, H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-1W), Navy F/A-18, Marine Corps F/A-18, 
Navy Helicopter (H-60), and Marine Corps Helicopter (H-53, H-46, UH-1, & AH-
1W). The top two categories across all communities were skill-based errors and 
coordination/communication/planning factors. In general, these two categories 
occurred at a much higher rate than other categories, doubling the occurrence 
rate of the third place category in many cases. Judgment and decision-making 
errors appeared in the top five list of all but Marine Corps helicopters, where it 
placed seventh. Comparing these results to other aviation mishaps studies that 
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have used HFACS, revealed a degree of commonality in the type of human 
errors involved in all aviation mishaps (both commercial and military). 
The second analytical effort examined the results of a strategic human 
factors review conducted by the Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) in the 
spring of 2008. As part of this review, each individual squadron was directed to 
identify their top five human factors concerns. This data was collected using the 
nanocodes of the DoD-HFACS classification system. Squadrons were instructed 
that they could analyze current issues or try to predict the cause of the next 
mishap. Results from each squadron were compiled at the appropriate type wing 
(a collection of several squadrons operating similar aircraft platforms) and 
relayed to CNAF. To allow comparison with the results from the first analytical 
effort, only F/A-18 and H-60 aircraft data was analyzed. Five out of six type wings 
for F/A-18 and H-60 squadrons identified ops tempo/workload, proficiency, 
complacency, and motivational exhaustion (burnout) as being among their top 
five concerns. These nanocodes belong to the DoD-HFACS levels of 
organization, supervision, and preconditions, which sharply contrasted the act-
level errors identified in the mishap data from the first analytical effort. While this 
difference could be influenced by biases inherent in the points of view of mishap 
investigators and aircrews, it also demonstrates that mishap investigations do not 
tell the complete story in regards to the causes of mishaps. In order for safety 
professionals to fully understand all the influential factors causing mishaps, both 
perspectives must be considered. 
The third analytical effort examined a mishap intervention and evaluation 
methodology, called the Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX), proposed by 
Shappell and Wiegmann (2006, 2009, in press). A number of recommendations 
were suggested based upon the unique needs of the Navy to make the 
framework more useful for program managers involved in the development of 
new aircraft. HFIX uses five domains of possible intervention sources 
(organizational/administrative, human/crew, technology/engineering, task/ 
mission, and operational/physical environment) and uses them to guide 
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brainstorming sessions conducted by a group of aviation professionals from 
varied backgrounds. Once ideas are generated, they are compared and 
evaluated based of the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, cost, effectiveness, and 
sustainability. The HFIX domains of possible intervention sources were found 
lacking and two other sources of intervention strategies were considered: human 
systems integration (HSI) and doctrine, organization, training, material, 
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Analyzing the merits of each, 
an alternative list of mishap intervention domains that draws upon the 
advantages of each was presented. These domains were: mission, manpower, 
personnel, training, human factors engineering, policy/procedures, leadership, 
and facilities/environment. Additionally, the original form of HFIX only addresses 
mishap causes at the acts level of HFACS. Although mishap investigations tend 
to cite causal errors at this level, the second analytical effort suggests that higher 
levels such as preconditions, supervision, and organization should also be 
considered. In the revised version of HFIX all twenty categories of DoD-HFACS 
were open to scrutiny. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The examination of Naval Safety Center mishap data and CNAF strategic 
human factors review data revealed an interesting disparity in leading human 
factors concerns. While mishap investigations tended to identify human errors at 
the acts level of DoD-HFACS, the CNAF data tended to identify higher levels 
such as organizational, supervisory, and preconditions. This difference suggests 
that mishap investigations are not necessarily the most accurate predictor of the 
causes of future mishaps. Continued research in this area should explore the 
relative ability of mishap investigations and operator surveys to predict future 
mishaps. For the Naval Safety Center, it is suggested that aircrew surveys that 
use the DoD-HFACS taxonomy as a coding scheme can be a helpful source in 
identifying future mishap causes and developing intervention strategies.  
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The revised HFIX methodology presented in this thesis is intended to 
provide a framework for developing effective interventions across a number of 
organizational levels within the DoD. Individual squadrons that have identified 
human factors concerns could use it to improve their local safety programs as an 
element of their required quarterly human factors board. The Naval Safety Center 
could also benefit from using this methodology to address mishaps in aviation 
and other communities. Finally, DoD acquisition program managers could use 
this methodology as part of a comprehensive human factors safety evaluation for 
a future system. Further study should validate the application of this revised 
version of HFIX in these various areas. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The cost of mishaps to the DoD in terms of personnel, equipment, and 
financial resources continues to be a driving factor in the pursuit of reducing 
aviation mishap rates. Although technological and engineering improvements 
have drastically reduced the frequency of mishaps over the last 30 years, the 
remaining constant is human error. It is unlikely human error will ever be 
eliminated as a mishap casual factor. However, the effective application of the 
eight mishap intervention domains (mission, manpower, personnel, training, 
human factors engineering, policy/procedures, leadership, and facilities/ 
environment) may be able to reduce its influence. The multidisciplinary approach 
of HSI is useful in comparing the relative merit of various intervention strategies 
and performing tradeoffs in order to arrive at an acceptable solution. The revised 
HFIX methodology draws upon this approach to provide a comprehensive 
approach to mishap intervention. 
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APPENDIX.  DOD-HFACS NANOCODES 
Acts 
Are those factors that are most closely tied to the mishap, and can be described 
as active failures or actions committed by the operator that result in human error 
or unsafe situation. 
 
Errors (AExxx) 
Are factors in a mishap when mental or physical activities of the operator 
fail to achieve their intended outcome as a result of skill-based, 
perceptual, or judgment and decision making errors leading to an unsafe 
situation. Errors are unintended. 
 
Skill-Based Errors (AE1xx) 
Are factors in a mishap when errors occur in the operator’s 
execution of a routine, highly practiced task relating to procedure, 
training or proficiency and result in an unsafe a situation. 
 
AE101 Inadvertent Operation 
Inadvertent Operation is a factor when individual’s 
movements inadvertently activate or deactivate equipment, 
controls or switches when there is no intent to operate the 
control or device. This action may be noticed or unnoticed by 
the individual. 
 
AE102 Checklist Error 
Checklist Error is a factor when the individual, either through 
an act of commission or omission makes a checklist error or 
fails to run an appropriate checklist and this failure results in 
an unsafe situation. 
 
AE103 Procedural Error 
Procedural Error is a factor when a procedure is 
accomplished in the wrong sequence or using the wrong 
technique or when the wrong control or switch is used. This 





AE104 Overcontrol/ Undercontrol 
Overcontrol/Undercontrol is a factor when an individual 
responds inappropriately to conditions by either 
overcontroling or undercontroling the aircraft/vehicle/system. 
The error may be a result of preconditions or a temporary 
failure of coordination. 
 
AE105 Breakdown in Visual Scan 
Breakdown in Visual Scan is a factor when the individual 
fails to effectively execute learned/practiced internal or 
external visual scan patterns leading to unsafe situation. 
 
AE106 Inadequate Anti-G Straining Maneuver 
Inadequate Anti-G Straining Maneuver is a factor when the 
individuals AGSM is improper, inadequate, poorly timed or 
non-existent and this leads to adverse neurocirculatory 
effects. 
 
Judgment and Decision-Making Errors (AE2xx) 
Are factors in a mishap when behavior or actions of the individual 
proceed as intended yet the chosen plan proves inadequate to 
achieve the desired end-state and results in an unsafe situation. 
 
AE201 Risk Assessment – During Operation 
Risk Assessment – During Operation is a factor when the 
individual fails to adequately evaluate the risks associated 
with a particular course of action and this faulty evaluation 
leads to inappropriate decision and subsequent unsafe 
situation. This failure occurs in real-time when formal risk-
assessment procedures are not possible. 
 
AE202 Task Misprioritization 
Task Misprioritization is a factor when the individual does not 
organize, based on accepted prioritization techniques, the 
tasks needed to manage the immediate situation. 
 
AE203 Necessary Action – Rushed 
Necessary Action – Rushed is a factor when the individual 
takes the necessary action as dictated by the situation but 
performs these actions too quickly and the rush in taking 
action leads to an unsafe situation. 
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AE204 Necessary Action – Delayed 
Necessary Action – Delayed is a factor when the individual 
selects a course of action but elects to delay execution of the 
actions and the delay leads to an unsafe situation. 
 
AE205 Caution/Warning – Ignored 
Caution/Warning – Ignored is a factor when a caution or 
warning is perceived and understood by the individual but is 
ignored by the individual leading to an unsafe situation. 
 
AE206 Decision-Making During Operation 
Decision-Making During Operation is a factor when the 
individual through faulty logic selects the wrong course of 
action in a time-constrained environment. 
 
Perception Errors (AE3xx) 
Are factors in a mishap when misperception of an object, threat or 
situation, (such as visual, auditory, proprioceptive, or vestibular 
illusions, cognitive or attention failures, etc), results in human error. 
 
AE301 Error due to Misperception 
Error due to Misperception is a factor when an individual 
acts or fails to act based on an illusion; misperception or 




Are factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator represent willful 
disregard for rules and instructions and lead to an unsafe situation. 
Violations are deliberate. 
 
AV001 Violation - Based on Risk Assessment 
Violation- Based on Risk Assessment is a factor when the 
consequences/risk of violating published procedures was 
recognized, consciously assessed and honestly determined 
by 
the individual, crew or team to be the best course of action. 
Routine “work-arounds” and unofficial procedures that are 
accepted by the community as necessary for operations are 
also captured under this code. 
 
AV002 Violation - Routine/Widespread 
Violation - Routine/Widespread is a factor when a procedure 
or policy violation is systemic in a unit/setting and not based 
on a risk assessment for a specific situation. It needlessly 
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commits the individual, team, or crew to an unsafe course-
of-action. These violations may have leadership sanction 
and may not routinely result in disciplinary/administrative 
action. Habitual violations of a single individual or small 
group of individuals within a unit can constitute a 
routine/widespread violation if the violation was not routinely 
disciplined or was condoned by supervisors. These 
violations may also be referred to as “Routine Violations.” 
 
AV003 Violation - Lack of Discipline 
Violation - Lack of Discipline is a factor when an individual, 
crew or team intentionally violates procedures or policies 
without cause or need. These violations are unusual or 
isolated to specific individuals rather than larger groups. 
There is no evidence of these violations being condoned by 
leadership. These violations may also be referred to as 
“exceptional violations.” (NOTE: These violations may also 
carry UCMJ consequences. Boards should consult the 
Judge Advocate of the convening authority.) 
 
Preconditions 
Are factors in a mishap if active and/or latent preconditions such as 
conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel factors affect 
practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error or an 
unsafe situation. 
 
Environmental Factors (PExxx) 
Are factors in a mishap if physical or technological factors affect practices, 
conditions and actions of individual and result in human error or an unsafe 
situation. 
 
Physical Environment (PE1xx) 
Are factors in a mishap if environmental phenomena such as 
weather, climate, white out or brown out conditions affect the 
actions of individuals and result in human error or an unsafe 
situation. 
 
PE101 Vision Restricted by Icing/Windows Fogged/Etc 
Vision Restricted by Icing/Windows Fogged/Etc is a factor 
when it is determined by the investigator that icing or fogging 
of the windshield/windscreen or canopy restricted the vision 




PE102 Vision Restricted by Meteorological Conditions 
Vision Restricted by Meteorological Conditions is a factor 
when weather, haze, or darkness restricted the vision of the 
individual to a point where normal duties were affected. 
 
PE103 Vibration 
Vibration is a factor when the intensity or duration of the 
vibration is sufficient to cause impairment of vision or 
adversely effect the perception of orientation. 
 
PE104 Vision Restricted in Workspace by 
Dust/Smoke/Etc. 
Vision restricted in workspace by dust/smoke/etc. is a factor 
when dust, smoke, etc. inside the cockpit, vehicle or 
workstation restricted the vision of the individual to a point 
where normal duties were affected. 
 
PE105 Windblast 
Windblast is a factor when the individual’s ability to perform 
required duties is degraded during or after exposure to a 
windblast situation. 
 
PE106 Thermal Stress – Cold 
Thermal Stress – Cold is a factor when the individual is 
exposed to cold resulting in compromised function. 
 
PE107 Thermal Stress – Heat 
Thermal Stress – Heat is a factor when the individual is 
exposed to heat resulting in compromised function. 
 
PE108 Maneuvering Forces – In-Flight 
Maneuvering Forces – In-Flight is a factor when acceleration 
forces of longer than one second cause injury, prevent or 
interfere with the performance of normal duties. Do not 
use this code to capture G-induced loss of consciousness 
 
PE109 Lighting of Other Aircraft/Vehicle 
Lighting of Other Aircraft/Vehicle is a factor when the 
absence, pattern, intensity or location of the lighting of other 




PE110 Noise Interference 
Noise Interference is a factor when any sound not directly 
related to information needed for task accomplishment 
interferes with the individual’s ability to perform that task. 
 
PE111 Brownout/Whiteout 
Brownout/Whiteout is a factor when dust, snow, water, ash 
or other particulates in the environment are disturbed by the 
aircraft, vehicle or person and cause a restriction of vision to 
a point where normal duties are affected. 
 
Technological Environment (PE2xx) 
Are factors in a mishap when cockpit/vehicle/control station/ 
workspace design factors or automation affect the actions of 
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
PE201 Seating and Restraints 
Seating and Restraints is a factor when the design of the 
seat or restraint system, the ejection system, seat comfort or 
poor impact-protection qualities of the seat create an unsafe 
situation. 
 
PE202 Instrumentation and Sensory Feedback Systems 
Instrumentation and Sensory Feedback Systems is a factor 
when instrument factors such as design, reliability, lighting, 
location, symbology or size are inadequate and create an 
unsafe situation. This includes NVDs, HUD, off-bore-site and 
helmet-mounted display systems and inadequacies in 
auditory or tactile situational awareness or warning systems 
such as aural voice warnings or stick shakers. 
 
PE203 Visibility Restrictions 
Visibility Restrictions is a factor when the lighting system, 
windshield/windscreen/canopy design, or other obstructions 
prevent necessary visibility and create an unsafe situation. 
This includes glare or reflections on the canopy/windscreen/ 
windshield.  Visibility restrictions due to weather or 
environmental conditions are captured under PE101 or 
PE102. 
 
PE204 Controls and Switches 
Controls and Switches is a factor when the location, shape, 
size, design, reliability, lighting or other aspect of a control or 




Automation is a factor when the design, function, reliability, 
use guidance, symbology, logic or other aspect of automated 
systems creates an unsafe situation. 
 
PE206 Workspace Incompatible with Human 
Workspace Incompatible with Human is a factor when the 
workspace is incompatible with the mission requirements 
and mission safety for this individual. 
 
PE207 Personal Equipment Interference 
Personal Equipment Interference is a factor when the 
individual’s personal equipment interferes with normal duties 
or safety. 
 
PE208 Communications – Equipment 
Communications - Equipment is a factor when comm. 
equipment is inadequate or unavailable to support mission 
demands. (i.e., aircraft/vehicle with no intercom) This 
includes electronically or physically blocked transmissions. 
Communications can be voice, data or multi-sensory. 
 
Condition of Individuals (PCxxx) 
Are factors in a mishap if cognitive, psycho-behavioral, adverse physical 
state, or physical/mental limitations affect practices, conditions or actions 
of individuals and result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
Cognitive Factors (PC1xx) 
Are factors in a mishap if cognitive or attention management 
conditions affect the perception or performance of individuals and 
result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
PC101 Inattention 
Inattention is a factor when the individual has a state of 
reduced conscious attention due to a sense of security, self-
confidence, boredom or a perceived absence of threat from 
the environment which degrades crew performance. (This 
may often be a result of highly repetitive tasks. Lack of a 
state of alertness or readiness to process immediately 
available information.) 
 
PC102 Channelized Attention 
Channelized Attention is a factor when the individual is 
focusing all conscious attention on a limited number of 
environmental cues to the exclusion of others of a 
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subjectively equal or higher or more immediate priority, 
leading to an unsafe situation. May be 
described as a tight focus of attention that leads to the 
exclusion of comprehensive situational information. 
 
PC103 Cognitive Task Oversaturation 
Cognitive Task Oversaturation is a factor when the quantity 
of information an individual must process exceeds their 
cognitive or mental resources in the amount of time available 
to process the information. 
 
PC104 Confusion 
Confusion is a factor when the individual is unable to 
maintain a cohesive and orderly awareness of events and 
required actions and experiences a state characterized by 
bewilderment, lack of clear thinking, or (sometimes) 
perceptual disorientation. 
 
PC105 Negative Transfer 
Negative Transfer is a factor when the individual reverts to a 
highly learned behavior used in a previous system or 




Distraction is a factor when the individual has an interruption 
of attention and/or inappropriate redirection of attention by 
an environmental cue or mental process that degrades 
performance. 
 
PC107 Geographic Misorientation (Lost) 
Geographic Misorientation (Lost) is a factor when the 
individual is at a latitude and/or longitude different from 
where he believes he is or at a lat/long unknown to the 
individual and this creates an unsafe situation. 
 
PC108 Checklist Interference 
Checklist Interference is a factor when an individual is 
performing a highly automated/learned task and is distracted 
by anther cue/event that results in the interruption and 
subsequent failure to complete the original task or results in 
skipping steps in the original task. 
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Psycho-Behavioral Factors (PC2xx) 
Are factors when an individual’s personality traits, psychosocial 
problems, psychological disorders or inappropriate motivation 
creates an unsafe situation. 
 
PC201 Pre-Existing Personality Disorder 
Pre-existing Personality Disorder is a factor when a qualified 
professional determines the individual met Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual criteria for a personality disorder. 
 
PC202 Pre-Existing Psychological Disorder 
Pre-existing Psychological Disorder is a factor when a 
qualified professional determines the individual met 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual criteria for a psychological 
disorder. 
 
PC203 Pre-Existing Psychosocial Problem 
Pre-existing Psychosocial Problem is a factor when a 
qualified professional determines the individual met 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual criteria for a psychosocial 
problem. 
 
PC204 Emotional State 
Emotional State is a factor when the individual is under the 
influence of a strong positive or negative emotion and that 
emotion interferes with duties. 
 
PC205 Personality Style 
Personality style is a factor when the individual’s personal 
interaction with others creates an unsafe situation. Examples 
are authoritarian, over-conservative, impulsive, invulnerable, 




Overconfidence is a factor when the individual overvalues or 
overestimates personal capability, the capability of others or 
the capability of aircraft/vehicles or equipment and this 
creates an unsafe situation. 
 
PC207 Pressing 
Pressing is a factor when the individual knowingly commits 
to a course of action that presses them and/or their 




Complacency is a factor when the individual’s state of 
reduced conscious attention due to an attitude of 
overconfidence, undermotivation or the sense that others 
“have the situation under control” leads to an unsafe 
situation. 
 
PC209 Inadequate Motivation 
Motivation – Inadequate is a factor when the individual’s 
motivation to accomplish a task or mission is weak or 
indecisive. 
 
PC210 Misplaced Motivation 
Misplaced Motivation is a factor when an individual or unit 
replaces the primary goal of a mission with a personal goal. 
 
PC211 Overaggressive 
Overaggressive is a factor when an individual or crew is 
excessive in the manner in which they conduct a mission. 
 
PC212 Excessive Motivation to Succeed 
Motivation to Succeed – Excessive is a factor when the 
individual is preoccupied with success to the exclusion of 
other mission factors leading to an unsafe situation. 
  
PC213 Get-Home-Itis/Get-There-Itis 
Get-Home-Itis/Get-There-Itis is a factor when an individual or 
crew is motivated to complete a mission or reach a 
destination for personal reasons, thereby short cutting 
necessary procedures or exercising poor judgment, leading 
to an unsafe situation. 
 
PC214 Response Set 
Response set is a factor when the individual has a cognitive 
or mental framework of expectations that predispose them to 
a certain course of action regardless of other cues. 
 
PC215 Motivational Exhaustion (Burnout) 
Motivational Exhaustion (Burnout) is a factor when the 
individual has the type of exhaustion associated with the 
wearing effects of high operations and personal tempo 
where their operational requirements impinge on their ability 
to satisfy their personal requirements and leads to degraded 
cognitive or operational capability. 
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Adverse Physiological States (PC3xx) 
Are factors when an individual experiences a physiologic event that 
compromises human performance and this decreases performance 
and results in an unsafe situation. 
 
PC301 Effects of G Forces (G-LOC, etc) 
Effects of G Forces (G-LOC, etc) is a factor when the 
individual experiences G-induced loss of consciousness 
(GLOC), greyout, blackout or other neuro-circulatory affects 
of sustained acceleration forces. 
 
PC302 Prescribed Drugs 
Prescribed Drugs is a factor when the individual uses a 
prescribed drug with measurable effect interfering with 
performance. 
 
PC303 Operational Injury/Illness 
Operational Injury/Illness is a factor when an injury is 
sustained or illness develops from the operational 
environment or during the mission and this injury or illness 
results in an unsafe situation. This includes toxic exposure. 
Details of injury, illness or toxic exposure should be captured 
in the medical investigation. Do not use this code to capture 
injury or illness that does not cause an unsafe situation or 
contribute to the mishap sequence. 
 
PC304 Sudden Incapacitation/Unconsciousness 
Sudden Incapacitation/Unconsciousness is a factor when the 
individual has an abrupt loss of functional capacity/ 
conscious awareness. (NOT GLOC) Capture medical 
causes for the incapacitation in the AFSAS medical module. 
 
PC305 Pre-Existing Physical Illness/Injury/Deficit 
Pre-Existing Physical llness/Injury/Deficit is a factor when a 
physical illness, injury or eficit that existed at the time the 
individual boarded the aircraft or began the ission/task 
causes an unsafe situation. This includes situations where 
wavered physical defects contribute to an unsafe situation 
and situations where vision deficit or loss of prosthetic 
devices during the mission cause an unsafe situation. An 
individual must board the aircraft or begin the mission/task 
with prior knowledge of illness/injury/deficit otherwise mark 
and rate PC303. Details of injury, illness or deficit should be 
captured in the medical investigation. Do not use this code to 
capture injury or illness that does not cause an unsafe 
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situation or contribute to the mishap sequence. (i.e., 
medevac patient whose condition deteriorates during flight). 
 
PC306 Physical Fatigue (Overexertion) 
Physical Fatigue (Overexertion) is a factor when the 
individual’s diminished physical capability is due to overuse 
(time/relative load) and it degrades task performance. (The 
effects of prolonged physical activity, or the effects of brief 
but relatively extreme physical activity, either of which taxes 
a person’s physical endurance or strength beyond the 
individual’s normal limits.) 
 
PC307 Fatigue - Physiological/Mental 
Fatigue - Physiological/Mental is a factor when the 
individual’s diminished physical or mental capability is due to 
an inadequate recovery, as a result of restricted or 
shortened sleep or physical or mental activity during 
prolonged wakefulness. Fatigue may additionally be 
described as acute, cumulative or chronic. 
 
PC308 Circadian Rhythm Desynchrony 
Circadian Rhythm Desynchrony is a factor when the 
individual’s normal, 24-hour rhythmic biological cycle 
(circadian rhythm) is disturbed and it degrades task 
performance. This is caused typically by night work or rapid 
movement (such as one time zone per hour) across several 
time zones. Referred to as “shift lag” and “jet lag.”  (Time in 
the new time zone will lead to adaptation and recovery; the 
amount of time depends on the number of time zones 
crossed and the direction of travel. Recovery from shift lag 
may never occur.) 
 
PC309 Motion Sickness 
Motion Sickness is a factor when the symptoms of motion 
sickness impair normal performance. Motion sickness 
symptoms include nausea, sweating, flushing, vertigo, 
headache, stomach awareness, malaise, and vomiting. 
 
PC310 Trapped Gas Disorders 
Trapped Gas Disorders are a factor when gasses in the 
middle ear, sinuses, teeth, or intestinal tract expand or 
contract on ascent or descent causing an unsafe situation. 
Also capture alternobaric vertigo under this code. If the 
alternobaric vertigo induces spatial disorientation you must 
mark and rate PC508, PC509 or PC510. 
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PC311 Evolved Gas Disorders 
Evolved gas disorders are a factor when inert-gas evolves in 
the blood causing an unsafe situation. This includes, chokes, 




Hypoxia is a factor when the individual has insufficient 




Hyperventilation is a factor when the effect of ventilating 
above the physiological demands of the body causes the 
individual’s performance capabilities to be degraded. 
 
PC314 Visual Adaptation 
Visual Adaptation is a factor when the normal human 
limitation of dark-adaptation rate affects safety, for example, 
when transitioning between aided and unaided night vision. 
 
PC315 Dehydration 
Dehydration is a factor when the performance of the 
operator is degraded due to dehydration as a result of 
excessive fluid losses due to heat stress or due to 
insufficient fluid intake. 
 
PC316 Physical Task Oversaturation 
Physical Task Oversaturation is a factor when the number or 
complexity of manual tasks in a compressed time period 
exceeds an individual’s capacity to perform. 
 
Physical/Mental Limitations (PC4xx) 
Are factors in a mishap when an individual, temporarily or 
permanently lacks the physical or mental capabilities to cope with a 
situation and this insufficiency causes an unsafe situation. 
 
PC401 Learning Ability/Rate 
Learning Ability – Rate is a factor when the individual’s 
relative efficiency with which new information is acquired, 
and relatively permanent adjustments made in behavior or 
thinking, are not consistent with mission demands. 
PC402 Memory Ability/Lapses 
Memory Ability/Lapses is a factor when the individual is 
unable or has lapses in the ability to recall past experience 
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needed for safe mission completion. (experience includes 
any information a person receives through any means, any 
cognitive functions he or she performed on that information, 
and any response he or she made as a result of it.) 
 
PC403 Anthropometric/Biomechanical Limitations 
Anthropometric/Biomechanical limitations are a factor when 
the size, strength, dexterity, mobility or other biomechanical 
limitations of an individual creates an unsafe situation. It 
must be expected that the average individual qualified for 
that duty position could accomplish the task in question. 
 
PC404 Motor Skill/Coordination or Timing Deficiency 
Motor Skill/Coordination or Timing Deficiency is a factor 
when the individual lacks the required psychomotor skills, 
coordination or timing skills necessary to accomplish the 
task attempted. 
 
PC405 Technical/Procedural Knowledge 
Technical/Procedural Knowledge is a factor when an 
individual was adequately exposed to the information 
needed to perform the mission element but did not absorb it. 
Lack of knowledge implies no deficiency in the training 
program, but rather the failure of the 
individual to absorb or retain the information. (Exposure to 
information at a point in the past does not imply "knowledge" 
of it.) 
 
Perceptual Factors (PC5xx) 
Are factors in a mishap when misperception of an object, threat or 
situation, (visual, auditory, proprioceptive, or vestibular conditions) 
creates an unsafe situation. 
 
PC501 Illusion – Kinesthetic 
Illusion – Kinesthetic is a factor when somatosensory stimuli 
of the ligaments, muscles, or joints cause the individual to 
have an erroneous perception of orientation, motion or 
acceleration leading to degraded performance. (If this 
illusion leads to spatial disorientation you must mark and 
rate PC508, PC509 or PC510.) 
 
PC502 Illusion – Vestibular 
Illusion – Vestibular is a factor when stimuli acting on the 
semicircular ducts or otolith organs of the vestibular 
apparatus cause the individual to have an erroneous 
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perception of orientation, motion or acceleration leading to 
degraded performance. (If this illusion leads to spatial 
disorientation you must mark and rate PC508, PC509 or 
PC510.) 
 
PC503 Illusion – Visual 
Illusion – Visual is a factor when visual stimuli result in an 
erroneous perception of orientation, motion or acceleration, 
leading to degraded performance. (If this illusion leads to 
spatial disorientation you must mark and rate PC508, PC509 
or PC510.) 
 
PC504 Misperception of Operational Conditions 
Misperception of Operational Conditions is a factor when an 
individual misperceives or misjudges altitude, separation, 
speed, closure rate, road/sea conditions, aircraft/vehicle 
location within the performance envelope or other 
operational conditions and this leads to an unsafe situation. 
 
PC505 Misinterpreted/Misread Instrument 
Misinterpreted/Misread Instrument is a factor when the 
individual is presented with a correct instrument reading but 




Expectancy is a factor when the individual’s expects to 
perceive a certain reality and those expectations are strong 
enough to create a false perception of the expectation. 
 
PC507 Auditory Cues 
Auditory Cues is a factor when the auditory inputs are 
correctly interpreted but are misleading or disorienting. Also 
when the inputs are incorrectly interpreted and cause an 
impairment of normal performance. 
 
PC508 Spatial Disorientation (Type 1) Unrecognized 
Spatial Disorientation is a failure to correctly sense a 
position, motion or attitude of the aircraft or of oneself within 
the fixed coordinate system provided by the surface of the 
earth and the gravitational vertical. Spatial Disorientation 
(Type 1) Unrecognized is a factor when a person’s cognitive 




reality: attitude; position; velocity; direction of motion or 
acceleration. Proper control inputs are not made because 
the need is unknown. 
 
PC509 Spatial Disorientation (Type 2) Recognized 
Spatial Disorientation is a failure to correctly sense a 
position, motion or attitude of the aircraft or of oneself within 
the fixed coordinate system provided by the surface of the 
earth and the gravitational vertical. Spatial Disorientation 
(Type 2) is a factor when recognized perceptual confusion is 
induced through one or more of the following senses: visual; 
vestibular; auditory; tactile; proprioception or kinesthetic. 
Proper control inputs are still possible. 
 
PC510 Spatial Disorientation (Type 3) Incapacitating 
Spatial Disorientation is a failure to correctly sense a 
position, motion or attitude of the aircraft or of oneself within 
the fixed coordinate system provided by the surface of the 
earth and the gravitational vertical. Spatial Disorientation 
(Type 3) Incapacitating is a factor when an individual is 
unable to make proper control inputs for safe operation of 
the aircraft or system due to a conflict (often extreme) 
between the sensory systems identified in type 2. 
 
PC511 Temporal Distortion 
Temporal Distortion is a factor when the individual 
experiences a compression or expansion of time relative to 
reality leading to an unsafe situation. (Often associated with 
a "fight or flight" response.) 
 
Personnel Factors (PPxxx) 
Are factors in a mishap if self imposed stressors or crew resource 
management affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals and 
result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
Coordination/Communication/Planning Factors(PP1xx) 
Refer to interactions among individuals, crews, and teams involved 
with the preparation and execution of a mission that resulted in 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
PP101 Crew/Team Leadership 
Crew/Team Leadership is a factor when the crew/team 
leadership techniques failed to facilitate a proper crew 
climate, to include establishing and maintaining an accurate 
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and shared understanding of the evolving mission and plan 
on the part of all crew or team members. 
 
PP102 Cross-Monitoring Performance 
Cross-monitoring performance is a factor when crew or team 
members failed to monitor, assist or back-up each other's 
actions and decisions. 
 
PP103 Task Delegation 
Task delegation is a factor when the crew or team members 
failed to actively manage the distribution of mission tasks to 
prevent the overloading of any crewmember. 
 
PP104 Rank/Position Authority Gradient 
Rank/position authority gradient is a factor when the 
differences in rank of the team, crew or flight caused the 
mission performance capabilities to be degraded. Also 
conditions where formal or informal authority gradient is too 
steep or too flat across a crew, team or flight and this 
condition degrades collective or individual performance. 
 
PP105 Assertiveness 
Assertiveness is a factor when individuals failed to state 
critical information or solutions with appropriate persistence. 
  
PP106 Communicating Critical Information 
Communicating critical information is a factor when known 
critical information was not provided to appropriate 
individuals in an accurate or timely manner. 
 
PP107 Standard/Proper Terminology 
Standard/proper terminology is a factor when clear and 
concise terms, phrases hand signals, etc per service 
standards and training were not used. 
 
PP108 Challenge and Reply 
Challenge and reply is a factor when communications did not 
include supportive feedback or acknowledgement to ensure 
that personnel correctly understand announcements or 
directives. 
 
   PP109 Mission Planning 
Mission planning is a factor when an individual, crew or team 
failed to complete all preparatory tasks associated with 
planning the mission, resulting in an unsafe situation.  
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Planning tasks include information collection and analysis, 
coordinating activities within the crew or team and with 
appropriate external agencies, contingency planning, and 
risk assessment. 
 
PP110 Mission Briefing 
Mission briefing is a factor when information and instructions 
provided to individuals, crews, or teams were insufficient, or 
participants failed to discuss contingencies and strategies to 
cope with contingencies. 
 
PP111 Task/Mission-In-Progress Re-Planning 
Task/mission-in-progress re-planning is a factor when crew 
or team members fail to adequately reassess changes in 
their dynamic environment during mission execution and 
change their mission plan accordingly to ensure adequate 
management of risk. 
 
PP112 Miscommunication 
Miscommunication is a factor when correctly communicated 
information is misunderstood, misinterpreted, or disregarded. 
 
Self-Imposed Stress (PP2xx) 
Is a factor in a mishap if the operator demonstrates disregard for 
rules and instructions that govern the individuals readiness to 
perform, or exhibits poor judgment when it comes to readiness and 
results in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
PP201 Physical Fitness 
Physical Fitness is a factor when the relative physical state 
of the individual, in terms of a regular rigorous exercise 
program or a physically active lifestyle, is not adequate to 
support mission demands. 
 
PP202 Alcohol 
Alcohol is a factor when the acute or residual effects of 
alcohol impaired performance or created an unsafe situation. 
 
PP203 Drugs/Supplements/Self medication 
Drugs/Supplements/Self-medication is a factor when the 
individual takes any drug, other than prescribed, that 
interferes with performance. This includes nicotine or 
caffeine in sufficient quantities to cause impairment of 
normal function. This also includes any chemical compound 
taken for purposes of prevention of disease, treatment of 
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disease, weight management, mood alteration, birth control 
or sleep management, etc. The effects may be direct or 
residual. Alcohol is captured under PP206. 
 
PP204 Nutrition 
Nutrition is a factor when the individual’s nutritional state or 
poor dietary practices are inadequate to fuel the brain and 
body functions resulting in degraded performance. 
 
PP205 Inadequate Rest 
Inadequate rest is a factor when the opportunity for rest was 
provided but the individual failed to take the opportunity to 
rest. 
 
PP206 Unreported Disqualifying Medical Condition 
Unreported Disqualifying Medical Condition is a factor when 
the operator intentionally operates/flies with a known 




Is a factor in a mishap if the methods, decisions or policies of the supervisory 
chain of command directly affect practices, conditions, or actions of individual 
and result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
Inadequate Supervision (SIxxx) 
Is a factor in a mishap when supervision proves inappropriate or improper 
and fails to identify hazard, recognize and control risk, provide guidance, 
training and/or oversight and results in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
SI001 Leadership/Supervision/Oversight Inadequate 
Leadership/Supervision/Oversight Inadequate is a factor 
when the availability, competency, quality or timeliness of 
leadership, supervision or oversight does not meet task 
demands and creates an unsafe situation. Inappropriate 
supervisory pressures are also 
captured under this code. 
 
SI002 Supervision – Modeling 
Supervision – Modeling is a factor when the individual’s 
learning is influenced by the behavior of peers and 
supervisors and when that learning manifests itself in actions 
that are either inappropriate to the individual’s skill level or 
violate standard procedures and lead to an unsafe situation. 
 
 128
SI003 Local Training Issues/Programs 
Local Training Issues/Programs are a factor when one-time 
or recurrent training programs, upgrade programs, transition 
programs or any other local training is inadequate or 
unavailable (etc) and this creates an unsafe situation. (Note: 
the failure of an individual to absorb the training material in 
an adequate training program does not indicate a training 
program problem. Capture these factors under PC401 
“learning ability/rate” or PC405 “Technical/Procedural 
Knowledge.” The failure of an individual to recall learned 
information under stress or while fatigued despite attending 
an adequate training program does not indicate a training 
program problem. Capture these factors under PC402 
“Memory/ Ability lapses” or other cognitive factors such as 
PC104 “Confusion,” PC106 “Distraction,” PC105 “Negative 
Transfer,” etc.) 
 
SI004 Supervision – Policy 
Supervision – Policy is a factor when policy or guidance or 
lack of a policy or guidance leads to an unsafe situation. 
 
SI005 Supervision – Personality Conflict 
Supervision – Personality Conflict is a factor when a 
supervisor and individual member experience a "personality 
conflict" that leads to a dangerous error in judgment/action. 
 
SI006 Supervision – Lack of Feedback 
Supervision – Lack of Feedback is a factor when information 
critical to a potential safety issue had been provided to 
supervisory or management personnel without feedback to 
the source (failure to close the loop). 
 
Planned Inappropriate Operations (SPxxx) 
Is a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to adequately assess the 
hazards associated with an operation and allows for unnecessary risk. It is 
also a factor when supervision allows non-proficient or inexperienced 
personnel to attempt missions beyond their capability or when crew or 
flight makeup is inappropriate for the task or mission. 
 
SP001 Ordered/Led on Mission Beyond Capability 
Ordered/Led on Mission Beyond Capability is a factor when 
supervisor/management directs personnel to undertake a 




SP002 Crew/Team/Flight Makeup/Composition 
Crew/Team/Flight Makeup/Composition is a factor when, in 
the opinion of the investigator, the makeup of the crew or of 
the flight should have reasonably raised obvious safety 
concerns in the minds of crewmembers involved in the 
mission, or in any other individual directly related to the 
scheduling of this mission. 
  
SP003 Limited Recent Experience 
Limited Recent Experience is a factor when the supervisor 
selects an individual who’s experience for either a specific 
maneuver, event or scenario is not sufficiently current to 
permit safe mission execution. 
 
SP004 Limited Total Experience 
Limited Total Experience is a factor when a supervisor 
selects an individual who’s individual has performed a 




Proficiency is a factor when and individual is not proficient in 
a task, mission or event. 
 
SP006 Risk Assessment – Formal 
Risk Assessment – Formal is a factor when supervision does 
not adequately evaluate the risks associated with a mission 
or when pre-mission risk assessment tools or risk 
assessment programs are inadequate. 
 
SP007 Authorized Unnecessary Hazard 
Authorized Unnecessary Hazard is a factor when 
supervision authorizes a mission or mission element that is 
unnecessarily hazardous without sufficient cause or need.  
Includes intentionally scheduling personnel for mission or 
operation that they are not qualified to perform. 
 
Failure to Correct Known Problem (SFxxx) 
Is a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to correct known deficiencies 
in documents, processes or procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or 
unsafe actions of individuals, and this lack of supervisory action creates 





SF001 – Personnel Management 
Personnel management is a factor when a supervisor fails to 
identify an operator or aviator who exhibits recognizable 
risky behaviors or unsafe tendencies or fails to institute 
remedial actions when an individual is identified with risky 
behaviors or unsafe tendencies. 
 
SF002 – Operations Management 
Operations management is a factor when a supervisor fails 
to correct known hazardous practices, conditions or 
guidance that allows for hazardous practices within the 
scope of his/her command. 
 
Supervisory Violations (SVxxx) 
Is a factor in a mishap when supervision while managing organizational 
assets willfully disregards instructions, guidance, rules, or operating 
instructions and this lack of supervisory responsibility creates an unsafe 
situation. 
 
SV001 Supervision – Discipline Enforcement 
(Supervisory act of omission)  
Supervision – Discipline Enforcement is a factor when unit 
(organizational) and operating rules have not been enforced 
by the normally constituted authority. 
 
     SV002 Supervision – Defacto Policy 
Supervision – Defacto Policy is a factor when unwritten or 
“unofficial” policy perceived and followed by the individual, 
which has not been formally established by the properly 
constituted authority, leads to an unsafe situation. 
 
SV003 Directed Violation 
Directed Violation is a factor when a supervisor directs a 




Currency is a factor when an individual has not met the 
general training requirements for his job/weapon system and 
is considered “non-current” and supervision/leadership 
inappropriately allows the individual to perform the mission 






Are factors in a mishap if the communications, actions, omissions or policies of 
upper-level management directly or indirectly affect supervisory practices, 
conditions or actions of the operator(s) and result in system failure, human error 
or an unsafe situation. 
 
Resource/Acquisition Management (ORxxx) 
Is a factor in a mishap if resource management and/or acquisition 
processes or policies, directly or indirectly, influence system safety and 
results in poor error management or creates an unsafe situation. 
 
OR001 Air Traffic Control Resources 
Air Traffic Control Resources is a factor when inadequate 
monitoring of airspace, enroute nav-aids or language 
barriers in air traffic controllers cause an unsafe situation.  
Note: If the unsafe acts of an individual air traffic controller 
are determined to be a factor in a mishap then the controller 
must be added and investigated as a mishap person. 
 
OR002 Airfield Resources 
Airfield Resources are a factor when runways, taxiways, 
ramps, terminal ATC resources or nav-aids, lighting 
systems, SOF/RSU resources or the environment 
surrounding the airfield are inadequate or unsafe. If the 
airfield or environment created a visual illusion that 
contributed to the mishap sequence you must also mark and 
rate PC503 “Illusion - Visual.” 
 
OR003 Operator Support 
Operator Support is a factor when support facilities (dining, 
exercise, quarters, medical care, etc) or opportunity for 
recreation or rest are not available or adequate and this 
creates an unsafe situation. This includes situations where 
leave is not taken for reasons other than the individual’s 
choice. 
 
OR004 Acquisition Policies/Design Processes 
Acquisition Policies/Design Processes is a factor when the 
processes through which aircraft, vehicle, equipment or 
logistical support are acquired allows inadequacies or when 
design deficiencies allow inadequacies in the acquisition and 





OR005 Attrition Policies 
Attrition Policies is a factor when the process through which 
equipment is removed from service is inadequate and this 
inadequacy creates an unsafe situation. 
 
OR006 Accession/Selection Policies 
Accession/Selection Policies is a factor when the process 
through which individuals are screened, brought into the 
service or placed into specialties is inadequate and creates 
an unsafe situation. 
 
OR007 Personnel Resources 
Personnel Resources is a factor when the process through 
which manning, staffing or personnel placement or manning 
resource allocations are inadequate for mission demands 
and the inadequacy causes an unsafe situation. 
 
OR008 Informational Resources/Support 
Informational Resources/Support is a factor when weather, 
intelligence, operational planning material or other 
information necessary for safe operations planning are not 
available. 
 
OR009 Financial Resources/Support 
Financial Resources/Support is a factor when an 
organization or operation does not receive the financial 
resources to complete its assigned mission and this 
deficiency creates an unsafe situation. 
 
Organizational Climate (OCxxx) 
Is a factor in a mishap if organizational variables including environment, 
structure, policies, and culture influence individual actions and results in 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
OC001 Unit/Organizational Values/Culture 
Unit/Organizational Values/Culture is a factor when 
explicit/implicit actions, statements or attitudes of unit 
leadership set unit/organizational values (culture) that allow 




Evaluation/Promotion/Upgrade is a factor when an individual 
perceives that their performance on a task will 
inappropriately impact an evaluation, promotion or 
 133
opportunity for upgrade and this pressure creates an unsafe 
situation. Other inappropriate 
supervisory pressures are captured under SI001 Supervision 
– Inadequate. 
 
OC003 Perceptions of Equipment 
Perceptions of Equipment is a factor when over or under 
confidence in an aircraft, vehicle, device, system or any 
other equipment creates an unsafe situation. 
 
OC004 Unit Mission/Aircraft/Vehicle/Equipment Change 
or Unit Deactivation 
Unit Mission/Aircraft/Vehicle/Equipment Change or Unit 
Deactivation is a factor when the process of changing 
missions/aircraft/vehicle/equipment or an impending unit 
deactivation creates an unsafe situation. 
 
OC005 Organizational Structure 
Organizational Structure is a factor when the chain of 
command of an individual or structure of an organization is 
confusing, non-standard or inadequate and this creates an 
unsafe situation. 
 
Organizational Processes (OPxxx) 
Is a factor in a mishap if organizational processes such as operations, 
procedures, operational risk management and oversight negatively 
influence individual, supervisory, and/or organizational performance and 
results in unrecognized hazards and/or uncontrolled risk and leads to 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
OP001 Ops Tempo/Workload 
Ops Tempo/Workload is a factor when the pace of 
deployments, workload, additional duties, off-duty education, 
PME, or other workload-inducing condition of an individual or 
unit creates an unsafe situation. 
 
OP002 Program and Policy Risk Assessment 
Program and Policy Risk Assessment is a factor when the 
potential risks of a large program, operation, acquisition or 
process are not adequately assessed and this inadequacy 
leads to an unsafe situation. 
 
OP003 Procedural Guidance/Publications 
Procedural Guidance/Publications is a factor when written 
direction, checklists, graphic depictions, tables, charts or 
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other published guidance is inadequate, misleading or 
inappropriate and this creates an unsafe situation. 
 
OP004 Organizational Training Issues/Programs 
Organizational Training Issues/Programs are a factor when 
one-time or initial training programs, upgrade programs, 
transition programs or other training that is conducted 
outside the local unit is inadequate or unavailable (etc) and 
this creates an unsafe situation. (Note: the failure of an 
individual to absorb the training material in an adequate 
training program does not indicate a training program 
problem. Capture these factors under PC401 “Learning 
Ability/Rate” or PC405 “Technical/Procedural Knowledge.” 
The failure of an individual to recall learned information 
under stress or while fatigued despite attending an adequate 
training program does not indicate a training program 
problem. Capture these factors under PC402 “Memory/ 
Ability lapses” or other cognitive factors such as PC104 
“Confusion,” PC106 “Distraction,” PC105 “Negative Transfer” 
or one of the forms of Fatigue, etc.) 
 
OP005 Doctrine 
Doctrine is a factor when the doctrine, philosophy or concept 
of operations in an organization is flawed or accepts 
unnecessary risk and this flaw or risk acceptance leads to an 
unsafe situation or uncontrolled hazard. 
 
OP006 Program Oversight/Program Management 
Program Oversight/Program Management is a factor when 
programs are implemented without sufficient support, 
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